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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: -A BLACK VIEW OF
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT
By Morgan D.S. Prickett*
I.

Introduction

Who will deny the value of privacy? In this age of data banks,
governmental surveillance, and increasing sophistication in eavesdropping techniques, the word itself evokes images of hearth and home.
The value of this ethereal thing called privacy is seemingly self-obvious
and beyond dispute.
It may therefore come as a surprise to discover that the "right" of
privacy has been accorded constitutional protection only since 1965. In
that year the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Griswold
v. Connecticut. By a seven to two vote, the Court declared that a statute forbidding the use of contraceptive devices was unconstitutional as
an unconscionable intrusion into the privacy of the marital relationship.
Mr. Justice Black dissented. The Court's senior member felt that
the Court's announcement of a constitutional right of privacy was unwarranted because no specific constitutional provision guaranteed such
a right. The major emphasis of Justice Black's opinion was its accusation that "privacy" was an inchoate concept of uncertain dimensions
which a majority of the Court had adopted in order to transcribe their
personal ideas of normative social and political philosophy into constitutional dogma. Justice Black felt that the Court's action ignored wellestablished canons of judicial decision-making and threatened to upset
the balance of the constitutional system specified by the Framers of the
Constitution. Justice Black feared that the Griswold decision was the
harbinger of a return to substantive due process, a concept alien to the
judicial function and one which the Court had previously repudiated
after disastrous experience.2
Griswold was immediately recognized as a case of unusual importance. A prominent law school held a symposium on its meaning and
ramifications? A commentator in the American Bar Association Jour*
1.
2.
3.
(1965).

B.A., 1976; M.A., 1977, University of Southern California; member, third year class.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 520-22 (dissenting' opinion of Black, J.).
Symposium on the Griswold Case and the Right of riacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197
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nal called it the year's "most important decision." 4 Amid the near-universal approval of the demise of what the victorious attorney labelled a

"hopelessly insupportable piece of state legislation,"5 Justice Black's

dissent received reactions ranging from the puzzled 6 to the outraged.7
Eight years later the Court handed down the abortion cases8 and
founded its decisions squarely upon the Griswold right of privacy. By
this time,- Justice Black was no longer a member of the Court, but the

objections stated in his Griswold dissent have become the focus for the
growing unease among the public and legal profession concerning the
Court's decisions in the privacy area. The Court's actions have been

increasingly perceived not as impersonal applications of constitutional
principles, but rather as result-oriented assertions of essentially legislative power.' Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina defended his pro-

posed constitutional amendment banning abortion as "a stand against
what has become the shame of our nation-the widespread practice of
abortion thrust upon us by the FederalJudiciary."'" The fact that the
opposition to the Court's decisions has increased in both size and effec-

tiveness

1

demonstrates a current topicality which justifies a reexamina-

tion of Justice Black's initial criticisms of the privacy doctrine.
Justice Black did not deny that the use of substantive due process
might produce otherwise desirable results in certain instances.' 2 This
4. Keeffe, PracticingLawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J. 885
(1965).
5. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search ofa Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965).
6. More in sorrow than in anger, the response of the New Republic was typical: "Mr.
Justice Black, the Court's great literalist, at whose bidding the words of the Bill of Rights
and of the Fourteenth Amendment have in the past meant many an admirable thing...
was unable to see how due process laws or any others, could be read to protect [against this]
intolerable intrusion into the privacy of the conjugal bed." NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1965,
at 7.
7. Professor Glendon Schubert characterized Mr. Justice Black as a "rigid, crotchety,
dogmatic old man," and attributed his failure to join the majority to cultural obsolescence
and/or psychophysiological senescence. G. SCHUBERT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY 127
(1970).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9. E.g., NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 140; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922, 926 (1973).
10. 122 CONG. REC. 6456 (1976) (emphasis added). See also the remarks of the subsequent debate. Id. at 11,554-78.
11. The public reaction to the abortion decisions has now reached the dimension of a
mass political movement. See generally ConstitutionalConvention on Abortion Ban, 36 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, July 1, 1978, at 1677-79. The subject of the
Court's actions in the privacy area has not escaped critical examination by legal commentators, especially as it implicates the larger issues of constitutional doctrine and judicial competence. See, e.g., L. LusKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975) [hereinafter cited as LusKY]; Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Linde,
Due ProcessofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976).
12. 381 U.S. at 515-16. Mr. Justice Black cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
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primary justification for substantive due process is advanced by its defenders, who argue that its fluidity permits the Court to strike down
laws which are not prohibited by the terms of specific constitutional
provisions, yet which deserve condemnation because they are oppressive, arbitrary or otherwise repugnant to the "spirit" of the Constitution.' 3 But Justice Black insisted that while the contents of substantive
due process are uncertain, the dangers that attend its exercise are unchanging. He was convinced that the dangers so far outweighed the
immediate benefits that the Court should eschew substantive due process because it was constitutionally forbidden, and because 4it was too
perilous and unpredictable a tool for the Court to employ.1
This note will examine the Griswold decision at some length paying particular attention to Justice Black's dissent. The note will then
discuss the broader jurisprudential background underlying Justice
Black's criticisms. It will then assess the validity of these criticisms in
light of the evolution of the privacy concept over the last fifteen years.
The note will conclude with an examination of the Court's response to
these objections and the implications of the continued use of the privacy doctrine as measured against Justice Black's jurisprudence.
II.

The Griswold Case

Estelle Griswold had been convicted as an accessory to the violation of a Connecticut statute which read
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less
than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
She appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Ms. Griswold contended that the law infringed upon a right of privacy which was imbut which had never been
plicit in the totality of the Constitution
6
recognized by a decision of the Court.'
Seven members of the Supreme Court voted to reverse the convic(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) as two examples of presumably sound
results produced by objectionable reasoning.
13. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Dixon,
The GriswoldPenumbra: ConstitutionalCharterforan ExpandedLaw ofPrivacy?,64 MICH.
L. REv. 197, 202 (1965); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975).
14. 381 U.S. at 521-22.
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West). Griswold's conviction had been affirmed
by the appellate division of the circuit court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors.
State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
16. The gravamen of Griswold's theory on appeal was that the law as applied violated
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. For a discussion of the strategy involved, see Pollak, T. Emerson, Lawyer and Scholar: Ipse Custodiet Custodes, 84
YALE L.J. 638, 643-48 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pollak].
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tion and declare the law unconstitutional. Justice Douglas' opinion for
the majority17 acknowledged that Griswold had standing to maintain
the suit while asserting the rights of others. 8 Turning to the merits of
the constitutional issue, the Court confronted Griswold's contention
that the law was invalid because it violated the liberty interest secured
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 9 However,
Justice Douglas, suspicious of the overtones of substantive due process
implicit in this argument, "decline[d] the invitation" to base the decision on this ground. 0
Instead, Justice Douglas began his analysis by describing how, in
previous cases, the Court had recognized and enforced certain rights
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. For example, in NAACP
v. Alabama, the Court had declared that the "freedom to associate and
privacy in one's associations" are implicit in the First Amendment.2 '
The Court had reasoned that privacy was needed to prevent retaliation
against those who joined unpopular organizations to better exercise
their rights of free speech and assembly.2 2 As with the right to dis17. The Douglas opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Brennan and Goldberg. Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion for himself and Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Justices Harlan and White also delivered concurring
opinions. Justices Black and Stewart each dissented in an opinion joined by the other.
18. Griswold was executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.
Because her arrest and conviction were based upon her actions as a counselor to married
couples, te., assisting others to exercise their rights, the Court held that she had standing to
challenge the law on behalf of those with whom she had enjoyed a professional relationship
of trust. 381 U.S. at 481.
Griswoldwas the third challenge of the law to reach the Supreme Court. The issue of
standing had been determinative of the earlier suits, neither of which had reached a decision
on the merits as to the statute's constitutionality. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943),
the Court held that a plaintiff who sought to represent others in seeking a declaratory judgment of the law's constitutionality lacked the requisite standing to sue. In Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Court ruled that because of the desultory and erratic enforcement of
the law, a plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment had not presented a justiciable controversy when he was not threatened with fine or imprisonment for violating the law.
19. Pollak, supra note 16, at 648.
20. 381 U.S. at 481-82. At a later point in his opinion, Justice Douglas did refer to an
earlier opinion where he had accepted the view that the Connecticut statute infringed a
privacy interest which was a part of the "liberty" protected by the due process clause. Id.at
484 (citing Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). It is the
opinion of at least one commentator that Justice Douglas' emphasis upon the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights tacitly assumed that any right arising under the first eight amendments was made enforceable against the states through the due process clause. Clark,
ConstitutionalSources of the PenumbralRight to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833, 837 (1974).
To the extent that he implied that the due process clause played no role in his decision,
Justice Douglas was too emphatic. It is more likely that he was declining the invitation only
to the extent such a holding suggested that the law could be struck down solely with reference to the due process clause, thereby ignoring the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
21. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
22. Id. at 460, 462.
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tribute and receive opinions,2 3 the right of association was recognized
as an implicit component of the First Amendment, which had been
construed to encompass these peripheral rights in the belief that without them "the specific rights would be less secure."'24
Justice Douglas conceptualized peripheral rights as enabling
rights. Although unenumerated in the Constitution, they are recognized and enforced to facilitate the free exercise of rights which are
specifically guaranteed. When Justice Douglas defended the recogni-

tion of peripheral rights because their "existence is necessary in making

the express guarantees fully meaningful,"2 5 the clear implication was
that the intrinsic value of these rights was subordinate to their utility as
a means to an end.
Justice Douglas concluded from these cases that privacy was one
such peripheral right. He stated that "emanations" from certain specific constitutional provisions created "zones of privacy" which are

constituent elements of the rights guaranteed by the specific provi-

sions.26 These privacy rights exist in the interstices-what Justice
27
Douglas termed the "penumbras"-surrounding the express rights.

Yet peripheral rights, such as association, do not constitute privacy's
only source of constitutional protection. The Douglas opinion also examined several specific rights and discerned that these provisions also
protected privacy.
One of these provisions was the Fourth Amendment. In a 1949
decision, the Court had emphasized that privacy was at "the core" of
that amendment.2 8 Only four years before Griswold, the Court had
again spoken of "the right of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amend23. 381 U.S. at 482, citing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). See also Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
24. 381 U.S. at 483.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 484.
27. Thus, Justice Douglas spoke of the "right of association contained in the penumbra
of the First Amendment." 381 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
Penumbra is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (2d ed. 1949), at 623, as
"the space of partial illumination, as in an eclipse between the umbra, or the perfect shadow,
on all sides, and the full light[:] The shaded region around the dark central portion." For a
trenchant criticism of the phrase and its connotations, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY, 294 n.47 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
The idea that penumbral areas of constitutional provisions could be the source of constitutional rights and governmental power was not a novel concept. The core idea seems to
have originated during the heyday of the Court's use of substantive due process. See, e.g.,
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1928) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 607 (1934) (Stone, J., dissenting).
28. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:777

ment."29 Justice Douglas found that privacy was also protected by the

self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. That provision "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment."3 Together, the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments secure "'the sanctity of a man's home and the

privacies of life'-"3 from governmental intrusion.
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). The Court had so prominently discussed
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases that one commentator observed that at the time of
Griswold, privacy had become virtually synonomous with the right to be free from -unreasonable searches and seizures. Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the PenumbralRight to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REv. 833 (1974).
30. 381 U.S. at 484. The period immediately preceding Griswoldwitnessed a reevaluation of underlying rationale of the self-incrimination clause and its applicability to the states.
The traditional construction of the privilege was that it secured every individual's right to be
free from "all manifestations of compulsion, whether arising from torture or from moral
cause." Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1897). But this was the scope of the
federal right; until 1964, it had no application to the several states. See e.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908). Even when state officers employed torture or severe psychological duress to procure confessions, the Court eschewed reliance upon the self-incrimination clause.
Convictions so obtained were reversed for their repugnancy to the concept of due process,
not because the defendant was compelled to incriminate himself. See. e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
The Court reconsidered this position in 1964, one year before Griswold was decided. In
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court abandoned the view that the self-incrimination clause was not applicable per se to the states. The Court was now of the opinion that
the Fourteenth Amendment secured the privilege from state invasion to the same extent that
it restrained the federal government. Henceforth, all units of government must respect "the
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will." Id. at 8.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), decided on the same day as Malloy, went beyond the abstract issue of the applicability of the privilege to the states and
examined the substantive policies represented in the self-incrimination clause. The Court
found that the privilege reflects "many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations." Id. at 55. Presaging Griswold's talk of "zones," the Murphy Court ascertained that
one of the purposes of the privilege was to preserve "the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life."' Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233
F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)). This
statement was of striking relevance to the Griswold decision. Yet Murphys "private enclave" went unmentioned in Griswold. Nevertheless, this omission does not detract from the
fact that Malloy, Murphy and Griswold, all decided within the space of 53 weeks, provide
strong support for the proposition that the Court was increasingly prone to conceive of the
Fifth Amendment as an independent source of constitutional protection for privacy. Like
the privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment, the privacy interest of the Fifth
Amendment was not found in the literal test of the Constitution. Rather it was a judicial
gloss drawn from the purposes and presuppositions of a constitutional provision.
31. 381 U.S. at 484, (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Boyd
was the first discussion of the conjunctive effect of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Cases
dealing with both amendments were thereafter a regular feature in constitutional litigation.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
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In addition, provisions which had not given rise to extended judicial examination reinforced Justice Douglas' belief that there was a privacy interest put beyond the reach of the State by the Constitution.
for privacy
This interest could be found in the Constitution's
32 solicitude
implicit in the Third and Ninth Amendments.
A third and final constitutional source of protection for privacy
provided the foundation for the Griswoldopinion. Although he did not
expound this idea at any length, Justice Douglas found that a general
intention to foster privacy is implicit in the purpose of the Bill of
Rights. He had earlier said that privacy is a value which inheres in the
concept of a free society. 33 Consistent with the belief that the Constitution presupposes a citizenry with the integrity and independence of
character which is promoted by the existence of a sphere of privacy
immune from governmental intrusion,3 4 Justice Douglas deemed privacy a predicate for the development and exercise of numerous constitutional freedoms. To achieve this end, Justice Douglas reasoned that
a zone of privacy for the individual is necessarily implied in the design
of the Constitution. This privacy is not within the literal terms of the
first eight amendments, yet it is of a piece with them, for both have a
common objective-to promote and sustain the maximum scope of unfettered personal liberty free from arbitrary governmental restraints.
This component source of privacy exists in a non-localized and inchoate state, yet it is within the contemplation of the fundamental law of
the land: "It emanates35 from the totality of the constitutional scheme
under which we live."
These sources of constitutional protection for privacy-peripheral
rights within the penumbras of specific provisions, the specific provisions with their expressly enumerated rights, and the unarticulated intention of the Constitution-were aggregated by Justice Douglas to
(1928); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The two continue to be asserted in
tandem. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
32. 381 U.S. at 484. In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Douglas had compared the
Connecticut statute with the Third Amendment and asked the question, "Can there be any
doubt that a Bill of Rights that in time of peace bars soldiers from being quartered in a
home 'without the consent of the Owner' should also bar the police from investigating the
intimacies of the marital relationship?" Justice Douglas' answer was that "The idea of allowing the State that leeway is congenial only to a totalitarian regime." 367 U.S. 497, 522
(1961) (footnote omitted) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)

that is implicit in a free society. .
tional scheme ...

.

("...

the privacy

. [and which] emanates from the totality of the constitu-

").

34. "The strength of our system is in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the independence of our people." PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Accord, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Seealso note 244

infra.
35. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[V/ol. 7:777

create and preserve a sphere of personal autonomy for the individual.
Their collective impact persuaded the Court that the right of privacy
36
urged by Griswold was deserving of constitutional recognition. Justice Douglas perceived that these diverse and discrete sources all contained the common denominator of a concern for privacy. He used this
insight to discern a single composite "zone of privacy" that manifested
itself as a distinct constitutional right.37
Having established legitimacy of the right of privacy, Justice
Douglas found that the marital relationship was within the penumbral
zone of privacy and thus immune from arbitrary state interference.3 8
There being a fundamental personal right of constitutional dimension,
it followed that the state law could be sustained only if it acheived its
aim by means which minimized restrictions on the right.3 9 In this respect Connecticut's statute was deficient, for it operated with "maximum destructive impact" on the marital relationship and consequently
on the right of privacy."0
A prominent feature of the majority opinion was its notable reluctance to embrace any rationale suggesting substantive due process.
This aversion was a departure from Justice Douglas' previous opinions
in the privacy area, which had evinced an unambiguous willingness to
accept the doctrine.4 But if Justice Douglas displayed second thoughts
about the wisdom of this position, five of his brothers-an outright majority of the Court-had no such hesitation. With varying degrees of
candor and enthusiasm, the concurring Justices made explicit their exercise of substantive due process.
Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion for himself, Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, which expanded upon one aspect
of the majority opinion. Justice Douglas had simply recited the text of
the Ninth Amendment on his way to establishing the various sources of
the right to privacy.4 2 Justice Goldberg went beyond this cursory treat36. 381 U.S. at 485.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Justice Douglas quoted the familiar principle that "a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."' Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
40. The potential for harm was implicit in the enforcement of the law: "If it can make
this law, it can enforce it. And proof of its violation necessarily involves an inquiry into the
relations between man and wife." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas was a bit more graphic in Griswold: "Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive .. " 381 U.S. at 485-86.
41. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); PUC v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. 381 U.S. at 484. The Ninth Amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
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ment and delivered the first full dress discussion of the Ninth Amendment in the Court's history. According to Justice Goldberg, while the
Ninth Amendment is not "an independent source of rights," nor is it
applied by the Fourteenth Amendment against the several States, 4 3 it is
"relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental rights" 44 not
specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments, 4 5 but nonetheless included in the liberty interests protected against state infringement
by the due process clause.4 6
Justice Goldberg, like Justice Douglas, thought it appropriate for
courts to seek out the unarticulated premises behind the Constitution.
Justice Goldberg would look to the "entire fabric of the Constitution
and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees" to discover those fundamental personal rights implied by the Ninth Amendment.4 7 Justice Goldberg felt that these fundamental rights could be
identified if judges consulted the "traditions and collective conscience
of our people," and the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. ' 48 Any
right discerned by this process is not rooted in the Ninth Amendment,
nor does the amendment have an intrinsic enforcement capacity.
Rather, the Ninth Amendment is an aid to the identification of fundamental rights; the rights themselves are secured from state infringement
by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 9
Once this innovative methodological foundation had been articulated, Justice Goldberg had no difficulty in identifying marital privacy
as one of these fundamental personal rights. Because it was "retained
by the people" as contemplated by the Ninth Amendment, Connecticut's attempted encroachment upon it was impermissible.5"
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
43. Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 493. Justice Harlan would later characterize the role of the Ninth Amendmerit as ". . . largely confirmatory of rights created elsewhere in the Constitution.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. 381 U.S. at 492.
46. Id. at 486, 493.
47. Id. at 495.
48. Id. at 493.
49. Justice Goldberg may have been accurate in maintaining that the Ninth Amendment is not itself enforceable against the states through the due process clause. The sources
he cited by James Madison, the author of the Ninth Amendment, are consistent with the
conclusion that the amendment was meant to restrain the federal government. 381 U.S. at
489-90. This interpretation could support the Framers' belief that fundamental rights did
exist but that the states were left with plenary authority in matters affecting such rights.
Standing by itself, the Ninth Amendment is harmonious with the opinion of Alexander
Hamilton-which was quoted by Justice Goldberg--that the Federal Government was one
of delegated powers. Id. at 489 n.4.
50. The use of the Ninth Amendment provoked much of the commentary that followed
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Justice Harlan concurred with the result reached by the Court, but
he declined to subscribe to either the Douglas or Goldberg approach.
In an earlier case he had stated that the "'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter'" is a most fundamental aspect of the liberty secured by the due process clause.-" Connecticut, through its statute, sought to intrude upon the most intimate details of the marital
relationship with the full panoply of its police powers. Justice Harlan
believed that rather than strain to fit the right of privacy into the existing framework of the Bill of Rights, the Court should examine a
challenged law for its compatibility with the due process clause. The
appropriate judicial inquiry should seek to vindicate and preserve "the

balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society. . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial impositions and purposeless restraints .
,,"I A law would be declared invalid if it encroached upon those basic values "'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' ,5 While specific provisions of the Bill of Rights could be factors in this examination as points of reference, they could not limit the
independent authority of the due process clause. 4 Justice Harlan
Griswold See, e.g., Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966
Wis. L. REV. 979; Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its Implications
for Republican Form of Government, 48 TULANE L. REV. 487 (1966); Paust, Human Rights
and the Ninth Amendment, 60 CORNELL L.J. 231 (1975); Van Loan, Natural Rights and the
Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1968); Note, Ninth Amendment Vindication of
UnenumeratedFundamentalRights, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 46 (1968); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance ofthe NinthAmendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814 (1966); Comment, 54 Ky. L. REV. 794
(1966). For the pre-Griswoldworks on the Ninth Amendment, see Dunbar, James Madison
and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627 (1956); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, Are There 'Certain Rights... Retained by the People'?, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962).
Most commentators found the use of the Ninth Amendment unconvincing. See, eg.,
BERGER, supra note 27, at 389-90; Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the PenumbralRight to
Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833, 837 (1974); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search ofa Doctrine, 64
MICH. L. REV. 219, 227 (1965) ("there remains grave doubt that the Ninth Amendment has a
significant future"); Kauper, Penumbras,Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamentaland
Things Forgotten, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 254 (1965) ("the Ninth Amendment adds a nice
ornament ... but that is all."). However, this skepticism was not entirely in response to
Griswold. Ten years before, Justice Robert Jackson admitted that "the Ninth Amendment
rights which are not to be disturbed by the federal government are still a mystery to me." R.
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 74-75 (1955).
51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Prince v.

Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
52. Id. at 542, 543.
53. 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
54. Id.

Spring 19801

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

voted to strike down the Connecticut statute because the concept of due
process condemned any law "so grossly offensive" to the privacy of the
marital relationship. 5
Justice White, like Justice Harlan, proceeded on the premise that
the appropriate standard of judicial review was set by the due process
clause. Justice White concurred on the ground that Connecticut had
failed to justify its intrusion into the basic personal right of marital
privacy
by demonstrating that the law promoted a compelling state in56
terest.
Griswold was not so much a break with the past as it was the culmination of a process which had been evolving in the Supreme Court
over the previous seventy-five years. Concern with privacy had figured
in the Court's treatment of cases arising under the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments and, more recently, the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As matters stood at the time Griswold was
decided, the issue of privacy was neither novel nor unfathomable.
However, because judicial protection of privacy was made to depend
upon the reach of the specific provision most relevant within the context of the particular case and the claimed privacy interest, the scope of
judicial action was limited.
First and foremost was the importance of privacy to the Fourth
Amendment. The earliest and most influential opinion dealing with
that provision had devoted considerable attention to the protection afforded privacy by the Constitution's ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures. 5 7 Although the Court's dedication to privacy may have subsequently wavered in fact,5 8 the Court never denied its primacy in theory.
Even when the Court was unsympathetic to the specific claim advanced, the right of privacy never failed to evoke the most glowing of
tributes. 9
In 1949, the Court began the process of converting the right to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures into the functional
equivalent of a limited right of privacy. 0 Privacy was declared to be at
the "core" of the Fourth Amendment, which was itself absorbed into
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus made
applicable as against the several States.6 1 The Court did not, however,
55. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. 381 U.S. at 502-04 (White, J., concurring).
57. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
58. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
59. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 362-66 (1959). See also J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 57 (1966).
60. Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the PenumbralRight to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. Rav.
833 (1974).
61. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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require that the states adopt the federal sanction of excluding evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It preferred to interpret
the need for a healthy federalism as requiring leeway for the states to
develop their own methods for securing privacy. But after a dozen
years of disappointed hopes that the protection of this privacy interest
could be entrusted to the states, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio6 2 held that
the constitutional status of privacy demanded that all units of government comply with the federal example.
The privacy protected by the Fifth Amendment, after an ambiguous start,6 3 had fallen into an extended period of neglect.' 4 Commentators' insistent clamoring for the Court to extend greater protection to
the privilege against self-incrimination65 dovetailed with the Warren
Court's rapid absorption of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights into
the due process clause.6 6 The result was an interest in privacy against
official interrogation being raised to a level of prominence roughly
comparable to that of the Fourth Amendment. The Court's decisions
in Malloy v. Hogan6 7 and Murphy v. New York Waterfront Commission 68 guaranteed every person who claimed the right against self-incrimination "a private enclave where he may lead a private life" free
from governmental intrusion.69
The Court had also dealt extensively with privacy issues within the
context of the First Amendment. In the process, it recognized that the
protected exercise of free speech and assembly rights was often dependent upon a certain measure of anonymity. For example, the right to
freely exercise one's religion may require privacy to prevent public ridicule.7 0 Similarly, political groups whose beliefs are disharmonious
with the existing orthodoxy might require privacy for their members in
the lawful pursuit of their right to associate in order to promote the
exercise of their rights of free speech.7 At the same time, the Court
62. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

63. The Court's decision in Boyd linked the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to the ban on self-incrimination contained in the Fifth
Amendment. 116 U.S. at 633. This aspect of the decision was generally rejected by commentators. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 57-60 (1964).

64. E.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78

(1908).
65. E.g., Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP.
CT. REV. 212; Dykstra, The Right Most Valuedby Civilized Man, 6 UTAH L. REV. 305 (1959);
Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).

66. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (freedom from cruel and unusual punishment).
67. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

69. d. at 55.
70. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
71. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Butcf.New York exrel. Bryant v. Zim-
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recognized a considerable degree of state power to protect the privacy
of the public. Thus privacy had both positive and negative aspects for
the government and for individuals. The state must respect the privacy
interests attending the exercise of certain rights, yet it could also protect
the privacy of its residents from some of the72more intrusive effects
which the exercise of these rights might entail.
Privacy is a component of each of these amendments, not because
it is mentioned in their respective texts, but rather because the Court,
confronted with recurring fact situations, had recognized the need for
privacy to make their actual operation effective. Cases such as Rochin
v. Calfornia73 and Poe v. Ullman74 illuminated many inadequacies of

the conventional analytical framework, which tended to limit privacy
by a rigid categorization dependent upon the relation between a
claimed interest and a specific constitutional provision. Increasingly,
abuses of privacy were found in the interstices of specific prohibitions.

Opinions on75 and off7 6 the Court indicated dissatisfaction with a judicial paradigm that was not according privacy sufficient protection and

which was denying an important principle the legal status commensurate with its perceived merits and importance. Accordingly, privacy
began to be located in the concept of due process, whose vague contours freed the Court from the shortcomings of a literal construction of
the constitutional text.77
The period immediately before Griswold had sensitized the Court
to the value of privacy and to the perils of entrusting its protection to
the states. The early 1960's saw the pace of privacy-related problems
accelerate: after NAACP in 1958, Mapp, Poe, Malloy and Murphy
merman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (constitutionality of law requiring oathbound unincorporated
association to file membership roster with state upheld when applied to group known to
engage in acts of violence).
72. Compare Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) with Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951).
73. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Rochin, the celebrated "stomach pump" case, offered the
Court an option to analyze the issue of coercive methods whereby police obtained evidence
as (1) a question of search and seizure, (2) a question of self-incrimination, or (3) one of both
search and self-incrimination. The majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, chose
instead to resolve the question purely on the basis of the due process clause.
74. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
75. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); PUC v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451,468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), where Justice Douglas spoke of "the need for a pervasive right of privacy against governmental intrusion [which] has been recognized though not
always given the recognition it deserves." Id. at 569 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
76. See, e.g., Nutting, The Fifth Amendment and Privacy, U. PlTr. L. REV. 533 (1957).
77. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); PUC v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 468 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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were all decided within a period of three years. The difficulties of accommodating novel privacy claims into the existing constitutional
framework and the growing tendency of some members of the Court to
resolve problems by referring to the due process clause persuaded the
Court of "the need for a pervasive right of privacy against Governmental intrusion. ' 78 This need was fulfilled in Griswold.
The almost overnight acceptance of the due process clause as the
primary method whereby privacy might be secured was reflected in the
opinions of the Griswold majority. In addition to differing degrees of
reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment, Justices Douglas, Goldberg
and Harlan found authority for the Court to impose implied limitations
on state and federal power in the underlying constitutional purpose reflected in more than one specific provision. Examination of the "totality of the constitutional scheme" identified a comprehensive privacy
interest which was derivative yet dynamic and flexible. This focus on a
general constitutional purpose, rather than on the limited ambit of any
particular specific provision, produced a composite constitutional right
of privacy which did not have a concrete nexus with the literal text of
any specific constitutional prohibition. In this manner, the Griswold
right of privacy was a generalized privilege whose nebulous contours
might be violated by state action which did not infringe upon one or
more of its constituent components.
III.

Mr. Justice Black: Griswold and Beyond

The primary dissent in Griswold came from Mr. Justice Black.7 9
His wide-ranging and spirited opinion thoroughly dissected the other
opinions of the Court; first the majority opinion of Justice Douglas and
then the opinions of Justices Goldberg, Harlan and White, which he
treated as a unit. Although prompted by the Court's novel treatment of
privacy, his opinion reflected concerns that had engaged his attention
for almost forty years. In a sense, his Griswoldopinion was the apotheosis of Justice Black's constitutional philosophy.
A.

The Douglas Opinion

Although the major emphasis of his opinion was focused upon his
perceived revival of substantive due process in the concurrences, Justice Black began by listing those points in Justice Douglas' majority
78. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 569 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
79. Mr. Justice Stewart was the only other dissenter. He concurred in Justice Black's
opinion and had his senior colleague join his opinion. 381 U.S. at 527. His opinion is most
noteworthy for its commonsense observation that the Court was declaring a right which
could be violated despite the fact that none of its constitutional components were offended
by the action of Connecticut.
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opinion with which he disagreed. Initially, Justice Black considered
Justice Douglas' references to the First Amendment to be inapposite.
That amendment protects speech; it does not sanction a concerted
course of conduct made illegal under state law. Although some speech
was involved, the dominant characteristic of the condemned behavior
was conduct. Accordingly, Ms. Griswold could not defend her actions
and overturn her conviction by reference to the First Amendment.8"
Similarly inapplicable was the Fourth Amendment, which forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice Black refused to countenance
what he perceived to be Justice Douglas' rewriting of that amendment
to substitute "privacy" for "unreasonable searches and seizures."'8

Justice Black was also disturbed by Justice Douglas' attempt to
recast language in order to shift the issue. Rather than engage in the

manipulation of terminology, Justice Black relied on more traditional
methods. For him, the determinative factors in constitutional interpretation were the language used by the Constitution and the history behind the words.82 Justice Black felt that judges should "stick to the
simple language"8 3 of the Constitution and recognize that the Framers
had chosen their words very carefully in order to address specific
evils. 84

The reason for this concern was basic. Justice Black believed that
the complete enjoyment of guaranteed liberties may be diluted, and the
constitutional protection afforded such rights may be diffused, if judges
make the Constitution's plain language uncertain of meaning or appli80. 381 U.S. at 407-08 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Giboney v. Empire Storage and
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
81. Id. at 509. Justice Black thought "privacy" an unfortunate term of uncertain
" Id. He would
dimensions. "'Privacy' is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept ..
later characterize it as a "nebulous subject." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting). He continued to object to what he considered the substitution of
"privacy" in place of constitutional language: Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1967)
(Black, J., concurring) ("privacy" substituted for plain language and intent of First Amendment); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (by substituting
"privacy" for unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court was playing "sleight-of-hand
tricks" with the Constitution's language).
Justice Black did not discuss the Third or the Fifth Amendments, the other specific
provisions cited by the Douglas opinion. He did, however, concur in Justice Stewart's dissent, which stressed the irrelevancy of these provisions to a decision of the case. 381 U.S. at
529 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, 8 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BLACK].
83. 381 U.S. at 509.
84. "The prohibitions of the Constitution were written to prohibit certain specific
things..
" Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Accord, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 500 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366-67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See also
Black, The Bill ofRights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 865, 867 (1960); Cahn, JusticeBlack and First
Amendment "Absolutes" A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 553, 554 (1962).
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cation.85 He also felt that any substitution of the Constitution's "simple
language" with words deemed more contemporary by judges convinced
of their obligation to "keep the Constitution in tune with the times"
threatens the safety of constitutional rights.8 6
Whatever the abstract value of privacy, Justice Black felt that government has a right to infringe upon it unless restrained from doing so
by a specific provision of the Constitution.8 7 He conceded that privacy
is a concept not totally alien to the Constitution. He believed, however,
that the Constitution's protection of privacy is of more modest dimensions than did the Court: "There are guarantees in certain specific provisions which are designed inpart to protect privacy at certain times and
places with regard to certain activities.""8 But there is no general constitutional right of privacy. 9
Because he was unable to find a constitutional provision safeguarding privacy, Justice Black refused to be distracted by Justice
Douglas' innovative nomenclature and novel methodology: "I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as an
emanation from one or more constitutional provisions." 9o For Justice
Black, the "simple language" of the Constitution would not stretch so
far.
B. The Concurrences
The primary focus of Justice Black's dissent was directed to the

concurring opinions of Justices Goldberg, Harlan and White. Justice
Black attacked these opinions, which together reflected the views of a
clear majority of the Court, as an application of substantive due process and the natural law method of adjudication. 9'
85. 381 U.S. at 509. Justice Black feared for the security of rights left to "the ingenuity
of language-stretching judges." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
86. 381 U.S. at 522.
87. Id. at 510.
88. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 509-10. Three years later, Justice Black would say that the Griswoldmajority
had "found some penumbras and emanations from various parts of the Bill of Rights to
make a right of privacy. I don't know about penumbras and emanations." New York
Times, Mar. 22, 1968, at 41.
91. Although the terms "substantive due process" and "natural law" were used interchangeably by Justice Black, they are not synonyms. Substantive due process is the formula
used by the Court to impose implied limits on the power of government. By itself, the
phrase describes merely a mode of judicial operation; it conveys no inkling of the values it
may be used to implement. Substantive due process is the value-free method for applying
the policies natural law claims to find within the vague contours of the due process clause.
Although this distinction was not articulated by Justice Black, it is not inconsistent with his
use of the terms. One observer of Justice Black's jurisprudential philosophy has given a
useful summary of what natural law is and how it is used by the courts: "According to
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By interjecting these principles into the due process clause, the
Court is able to give that provision a substantive content that Justice
Black felt goes beyond its proper meaning.9 2 He believed that the
phrase "due process," as used by the Framers, has specific and limited
connotations. 9 3 Due process did not license the Court to reserve to itexponents of the natural law approach, there exists a set of immutable moral principles
which should govern human relationships. For man-made regulations to be true law and
thus subject to obedience, they must conform to these principles. Under this view the
judge's task should ideally be one of 'deductive reasoning to general moral principles in
order to discover what is just in a given situation."' Yarbrough, Mr. JusticeBlack andLegal
Positivism, 57 VA. L. REV. 375, 377 (1971). For the accuracy of this statement, compare it
with the Court's statement in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905), a case Justice
Black found particularly obnoxious: "In every case that comes before this court, therefore,
where legislation of this character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal
Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty. . . ?" The
proposition was stated in its baldest form by Justice McReynolds: "But plainly, I think, this
Court must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 556 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). On natural law and substantive due process,
see generally E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948); C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); Corwin, The 'HigherLaw' BackgroundofAmeri-

can ConstitutionalLaw(pts. 1-2) 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-1929); Grant, The Natural
Law BackgroundofDue Process,31 COL. L. REV. 56 (1931).
92. Justice Black did not contend that the due process clause was totally devoid of substantive content, but rather that such content was strictly defined. One of his clerks put it
this way: "There were two facets of Justice Black's theory of due process. . . .Facet No. I
was that due process encompassed all the specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution.. . .The Second Facet, equally important, was that due process did not encompass anything else." H. BALL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JUSTICE HUGO L.
BLACK 80 (1975). For evidence that this was not strictly correct, see note 93, infra.
93. As a general proposition, Justice Black said the only "correct meaning" of due process is that which requires government to proceed according to the "law of the land-that is,
according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court decisions." This conception of due process derives from the Magna Carta and means that "our
governments are governments of law and constitutionality bound to act only according to
law." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
After surveying the Court opinions written or assented to by Justice Black, Professor
Roger Haigh listed the following elements of purely procedural due process accepted by
Justice Black:
I) The right not to be tried under vague or indefinite statutes.
2) The right to a public trial.
3) The right to have reasonable notice of the charges levied.
4) The right to cross-examine witnesses.
5) The right to call witnesses in one's own behalf.
6) The right to be represented by counsel.
7) The right to a fair trial by an impartial court.
8) The right to be tried by an unbiased judge.
9) The right not to be tried by a judge who has an interest in the outcome.
10) The right not to be convicted in the absence of evidence establishing guilt.
I1) The right to be free from convictions obtained through perjured testimony.
12) The right not to be tried by a jury convinced of guilt before trial begins.
R. Haigh, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, Due Process of Law and the Judicial Role 39 (unpub-
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self the power to strike down laws which it finds arbitrary, unreasonable or which conffict with the Court's ideas of what are "civilized
standards of conduct."9 4 Justice Black believed that judicial use of substantive due process was unwarranted for two reasons. His first and
dominant objection was that, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, it

distorted the judicial function envisaged by the Constitution. The second criticism was that, as a matter of discretion, substantive due process lured courts into areas where they were not competent to act.
L

DoctrinalObjections

Justice Black fully accepted the legitimacy of judicial review, if it
was confined to instances where statutes cannot be reconciled with the
specific provisions of the Constitution.9 5 He felt that the correct construction of the Constitution compelled courts to recognize that legislatures possess complete power to act in all areas except those expressly
withheld by the Constitution. 96 Unlike his concurring brethren, Justice
Black believed that neither the Ninth Amendment,9 7 nor the Fourteenth, alone or together, 98 could be utilized as a limitless grant of
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Fordham University, 1971). The
major points of this work are summarized in Haigh, Defining Due ProcessofLaw: The Case
of Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, 17 S. DAK. L. REV. 1, 18-25 (1972).
94. 381 U.S. at 511, 520.
95. Id. at 513, 520.
96. Id. at 513, 527. In support of this position, Justice Black quoted Justice Holmes'
dissent in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927): "I think the proper course is to
recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by
some express prohibition in the Constitution ..... "
97. 381 U.S. at 523 n. 19. Justice Black's view of the Ninth Amendment was that it was
passed not so much to guarantee rights unenumerated in the Constitution, but rather "to
assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal
Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication." 381 U.S. at 520.
Accord, BERGER, supra note 27, at 390; Moore, Ninth Amendment. Its OriginsandMeaning,
7 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 215, 284 (1972). Justice Black believed that the Bill of Rights was
"in response to a clamor of the people that some of the original Constitution's grants of
federal power were too broad and needed to be restricted. The last place therefore to look
for more expansive grants of federal power is in that Bill of Rights." BLACK,supra note 82,
at 31.
The fact that the Ninth Amendment, passed as it was to protect against federal invasion
of the power of the several States to enact laws they consider appropriate to the regulation of
local matters, had never before been used to strike down such laws strongly supports Justice
Stewart's belief that "[t]he Ninth Amendment, like its companion the Tenth. . . 'states but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.'" 381 U.S. at 529 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Prior to Griswold, at least two renowned scholars had discerned the potential of the
Ninth Amendment as a method for the use of natural law: R. POUND.in the Introduction to
B. PATrERSON, THE FORGOTEN NINTH AMENDMENT at iii (1955): Corwin, The "Iigher
Law' BackgroundofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1928).
98. 381 U.S. at 511.
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power for judges to impose their notions of sound public policy under
the guise of protecting "fundamental rights."
The issue of legislative authority was central to Justice Black. He
believed that substantive due process posed several dangers to the
otherwise plenary power of the people's elected representatives. It furnished an opportunity for the judiciary to (1) narrow the scope of legislative power, and (2) usurp the law-making function. The first result
occurs when the Court designates areas where no branch of government, including the Court, may operate. It is the assertion of a negative
power: when courts declare that legislative power cannot reach certain
objects, they do not necessarily expand their own power. In the second
situation, courts assume an active role that is not shared with the legislative or the executive branches. Justice Black felt that when courts
reserve to themselves the power to weigh the reasonableness of laws
and to create new rights out of whole cloth-which is the essence of
substantive due process 9 9-- they usurp the legislative function. Judges

assume this active role, according to Justice Black, when they do not
"stick to the simple language" but instead utilize considerations not
contained within the Constitution as authority to evaluate the wisdom
of laws and not merely their constitutionality.°° Justice Black believed

that any appraisal of the desirability of laws transfers legislative power

to the Judiciary.' 0 ' He cited the records of the Constitutional Convention to demonstrate
that the Framers had explicitly denied the courts
02

this power.1

This reduction of the legitimate scope of legislative power, and its
99. "Ifjudges have, however, by their own fiat today createda right of privacy. . . then
tomorrow and the next day and the next, judges can create more rights..
" Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a notorious
example of a "right" created by judges, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), wherein the Court declared the existence of a
"right to contract" largely immune from governmental interference.
100. Quoting from an earlier opinion of his, Justice Black said that for courts "'to pass
upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards enumerated in
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes
because of application of "natural law" deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the [first] instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other they
roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select
policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of
the people."' " 381 U.S. at 525-26 (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91-92
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
101. 381 U.S. at 513. The inviolability of the legislature's retaining exclusive possession
of the law-making power was a subject upon which Justice Black, a former United States
Senator, had definite if not dogmatic views. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
BLACK, supra note 82, at 25-26.
102. 381 U.S. at 513 & n.6.

796
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concomitant expansion of judicial power, as brought about by substantive due process,' 3 would, in Justice Black's opinion, upset a myriad of
policy decisions made by the Constitution. It would have a disastrous
impact on the separation of powers and it would also threaten traditional concepts of federalism. 104 The Griswold precedent of innovative
judicial action would make the Court a "day-to-day constitutional convention,"I 5 thus effectively nullifying Article V.'0 6 Lastly, should such
power be vested in five members of the Supreme Court, Justice Black
felt it would make our form of government dependent
upon the wills of
10 7
men and not upon the impersonal dictates of law.
Justice Black argued from the Court's recent history that the abnegation of the power to bring about such a dramatic redistribution of
governmental responsibilities had been accepted as the proper posture
for the Judiciary. Substantive due process had been repudiated by the
Court after it had been faced with a backlash from the other political
branches primarily in the form of the Court-packing plan of 1937.108
Since that time, the Court had consistently reiterated that it was not a
super-legislature or a revisory body which sits to "'weigh the wisdom
of legislation to decide whether the policy it expresses offends the public welfare.'-109 As recently as two years before Griswold, Justice
Black had written the majority opinion in Ferguson v. Skrupa"0 in
103.

Id. at 521.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 520.
106. Griswold was not the first time Justice Black had accused the Court of bypassing
Article V: Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 341-42 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); nor would it
be the last: Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 394 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). Accord, BLACK,
supra note 82, at 11. Cf.Allen v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 (1968) (Black,
J., dissenting).
107. The rule of law was, for Justice Black, more than a bromide; it was an abiding
concern. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); A. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 8 (1975); Howard, Mr. Justice Black.- The Negro ProtestMovement and the Rule of Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1030 (1967).

Justice Stewart raised the paradoxical possibility that the Court, by creating and enforcing "fundamental rights" in the face of a contrary legislative decision, might itself be denying the people their unenumerated Ninth Amendment right to self-government. 381 U.S. at
531 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Black was later to adopt and repeat this charge in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). He had earlier suggested that the
judicial use of substantive due process deprived states of their Tenth Amendment reserved
powers. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 (1945) (Black, J., concur-

ring).
108. 381 U.S. at 524.
109. Id. at 523 n.17 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952)). The accusation that a majority of the Court while using substantive due process was
acting as a "superlegislature" was first leveled by Justice Brandeis. Jay Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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which the Court declared its intention to return to "the original consti-

tutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislatures.""' Justice Black felt
that these doctrinal objections were being ignored by the Court in Griswold.
2

DiscretionaryConcerns

Justice Black also believed that other reasons existed which should
have persuaded the Court, as a matter of prudence, to reject the use of
substantive due process. Foremost was the problem of "fundamental

rights." Justice Black was convinced that all the concurring opinions
assumed that fundamental rights were self-evident without confronting
the core issue-that substantive due process must ultimately rest upon
whatever subjective considerations motivate a majority of the Court at
a given point in time with respect to a given issue." 12 The concept of
fundamental rights only underscored this element of subjectivity: the
"siren-like appeal" of the "soft phrases used to claim that power for
judges" 3 cannot conceal the fact that when constitutional interpretation is divorced from the text of that document, it must by necessity be
founded upon the personal beliefs of judges. The protestations of his
concurring colleagues notwithstanding, Justice Black believed these
idealistic phrases were mere "high-sounding rhetoric devoid of any
substantive guidance"" 4 which were employed only when judges were

enforcing their personal predilections." 5 He scoffed at the idea that

judges would not consider their personal convictions in their search for
I1. Id. at 730.
112. 381 U.S. at 522.
113. BLACK, supra note 82, at 21. In his Griswold dissent, Justice Black enumerated
some of the "catchwords and catchphrases" the Court had employed in prior cases. 381 U.S.
at 511 n.4. As one of the extremely rare examples of unintended humor in his opinions,
Justice Black would later say of these idealisms: "All of these different general and indefinable words or phrases are the fruit of the same, what I consider to be poisonous, tree, namely,
the doctrine that this Court has power to make its own ideas of fairness, decency, and so
forth, enforceable as though they were constitutional precepts." Foster v. California, 394
U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). He also called them nothing but "mush."
Cahn, Justice Black and FirstAmendment "Absolutes' .4 Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 549, 562 (1962).
114. BLACK, supra note 82, at 30.
115. 381 U.S. at 513. Justice Black claimed that he was supported on this point by the
late Judge Learned Hand, who said: ". . . [Judges are seldom content merely to annul the
particular solution before them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things
into consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the
contrary they wrap their veto in a protective veil of adjectives such as 'arbitrary,' 'artificial,'
'normal,' 'reasonable,' 'inherent,' fundamental, or 'essential,' whose office usually, though
quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute it to a derivation far more
impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision."
Id. at n.5 (quoting L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958) (emphasis added)).
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those privileges "so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 1 6 As he caustically
noted, the Court cannot take a Gallup poll nor does it have a "gadget"
to determine what constitutes such a privilege. I" Judicial divination of
the community's opinion therefore requires the interposition of the
judges' personal beliefs. The result is that once they release themselves
from the constitutional text which both limits and licenses judicial action, substantive due process "not only does not require judges to follow the Constitution as written, but actually encourages judges to hold
laws unconstitutional on the basis of their own conceptions of fairness
and justice." " "
Implicit in Justice Black's position was his belief that the Court's
prior experience with substantive due process in the economic field provided no guarantee that judges could be trusted with such unbounded
power." 9 The Court had reached the near-disastrous impasse of 1937
because it persisted in substituting its opinion of proper public policy
for that of the legislatures in the face of increasing public and professional hostility to the Judiciary's stance. The Court's historical failure
to gauge the public mood amply demonstrated the inability of1 20the Judiciary to function as a "thermometer of community feeling."
This inability to consistently and accurately mirror contemporary
opinion is a deficiency inherent in the activity of courts. It sometimes
can be advantageous, as when the courts defend the Bill of Rights
against transient majoritarian sentiment. But the point made by Justice
Black was that this institutional failing is an abiding characteristic of
the judicial function. More than a change of subject matter is required
before this "mysterious and uncertain concept" is divested of its latent
perils.' 2 ' The dangers of substantive due process cannot be defended
libertarian results deemed less objectionable to contemon the basis of 22
porary mores.'
Justice Black felt that if legislatures are deprived of the full measure of their constitutional power to enact laws pursuant to their own
notions of public welfare, the nation's fundamental ability to govern
itself would be endangered. This was not, however, Justice Black's sole
116. 381 U.S. at 519. The phrase was first enunciated by Justice Cardozo in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), and later adopted by Justice Goldberg, 381 U.S. at
487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
117. 381 U.S. at 519. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J.,
concurring).
118. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). Accord, Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
119. BLACK, supra note 82, at 11, 24-28.
120. BERGER, supra note 27, at 325.

121. 381 U.S. at 522.
122. Id.
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fear of substantive due process. He also believed that substantive due
process posed a threat to the continued effectiveness of the Judiciary.
Both of these concerns were encompassed within his characterization of
substantive due process as "bad for the courts and worse for the country." 123 This conviction, that the continued utility if not the very existence of judicial review could be jeopardized by the exercise of an
imperial judicial authority admitting of no external restraints, came
from Justice Black's personal experience. For the eleven-year period
prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1937, Hugo Black
was a member of the United States Senate.' 2 4 From this perspective he
had seen the Court of the "Nine Old Men" use substantive due process
to deprive Congress and state legislatures of much of their authority to
alleviate the desperate economic distress wrought by the Great Depression. The country's inability to govern within the judicially-imposed
confines of substantive due process had inspired President Roosevelt to
propose a drastic reorganization of the Judiciary. Senator Black had
been one of the most fervent supporters of the controversial "Courtpacking" plan.'2 5 From this perspective, Justice Black warned the
Court of the consequences of impinging upon legislative power-when
an aroused citizenry moves to halt a Judiciary bent upon the aggrandizement of its power, there can be no guarantee that any vestige of
judicial review will survive.
Justice Black knew that in one form or another, the temptation to
act on the basis of engaged emotions rather than the constitutional text
would always confront judges. He had lived through an era when the
nation's power to protect its existence was endangered by the inability
of judges to resist this Mephistophelean compulsion. It was for this
reason, along with a desire to prevent an unseemly repetition of the
judicial crisis of 1937, that Justice Black advocated a prophylactic rule
of complete judicial abstention from substantive due process.
Justice Black was convinced that a revival of substantive due process contravened the commands of the Constitution and the Court's past
123. Id. at 521.

124. The best treatment of Justice Black's pre-Court career in general and his Senate
experience in particular is V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARS (1972). Less

exhaustive works are G. DUNNE,

HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION

127-73

(1977); J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 50-94 (1949); Frank,
The New Court and the New Deal, in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSiUM 39 (S.Strickland ed. 1967).
125. H. BALL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK 21 (1975);

Frank, 7he New Court and the New Deal in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
SYMPOSIUM 45 (S.Strickland ed. 1967); V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA
YEARS 263 (1972). Thorough treatments of the "Court-packing" battle are J. ALSOP & T.
CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938), which has the advantage of being contemporaneous; L.
BAKER, BACK TO BACK (1967); W. Leuchtenberg, The Origins ofFranklin D. Roosevelt's
"Court-Packing"Plan, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 347.
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experience. He felt that the five concurring Justices had ignored these
compelling reasons why substantive due process should be avoided.
Justice Black could not accept their sanguine assurances that substantive due process could be judiciously and sparingly applied and that it
would represent only the impersonal attitudes of society and not the
personal beliefs of the judges as to what constituted sound public policy.
B.

Additional Considerations

Not all of Justice Black's objections to substantive due process
were contained within his Griswold dissent. Resonating within his
stated arguments are implied considerations of a more general nature
which constitute the lodestar of his constitutional philosophy and the
dominant motif of his career. These considerations went to the core of
the juridical ethic controlling the governance of a democratic system.
A central feature of Justice Black's condemnation of natural law
and substantive due process was his belief that it spoiled the symmetry
of the constitutional scheme. It was incongruous to consider the due
process clause, which is the usual outlet for natural law,* as "a blank
check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as written' 26 because
this would, in Justice Black's opinion, thwart the intent of the Framers
in making the Constitution a written document. 1 27 By committing the
fundamental law of the land to writing the Framers provided an objective standard against which the propriety of all laws and official conduct could be measured. 28 Justice Black believed that the men who
framed the Constitution recognized that abuse is an inherent temptation of those entrusted with power and that no one could be expected to
exercise unlimited power benevolently. He felt that "the Constitution
was designed to prevent putting too much controllable power in the
hands of one or more public officials."' 2 9 The Judiciary was not exempt from despotic tendencies, as the Framers recognized, for they
"cwrote into our Constitution their unending fear of granting too much
*

But not the only one. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled,Mad-

den v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (privileges and immunities clause); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-77 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (equal protection clause).
See also Karst, Invidious Discrimination:Justice Douglasand the Return ofthe Natural-LawDue-ProcessFormula, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969).
126. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
Accord, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 274 (1945) (Black. J., dissenting).
127. "Had the drafters of the Due Process Clause meant to leave judges. . . ambulatory
power to declare laws unconstitutional, the chief value of a written constitution, ...
designed to guarantee protection against governmental abuses, including those of judges,
must have written standards that mean something definite and have an explicit content."
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
128. Id See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 426 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
129. BLACK, supra note 82, at 23-24.
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power to judges."
Justice Black felt that substantive due process and natural law are
incongruities because they defeat this policy.1'1 The absence of objective content to these doctrines permits judges to decide cases, not according to the clear provisions of the Constitution, but rather in
conformity with their own notions of what is best for society. 132 Divorced from the Constitution, the inherently undemocratic nature of
the Judiciary is revealed when it nullifies laws without reference to the
basic charter of the nation. Arrogation of power by the Judiciary is not
possible when the source of that authority specifies where and to what
extent power is granted. It is this ultimate check1 that
33 guarantees a government of laws and not a government of men.
The extent and the ends to which power is granted are the
benchmarks of Justice Black's jurisprudence. Implicit in his opinions
discussing the correct scope of due process are a principle and a corollary which harmonize with his dissent in Griswold. The principle is
that the Fourteenth Amendment, by incorporating the Bill of Rights,
specifies the values the Court is required to protect against state inis that the Amendment also places absolute
fringement. The corollary
34
limits on these values.
Justice Black first articulated the role he thought the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to fulfill in 1947. In his celebrated opinion
in Adamson v. California13' he advanced what has come to be called the
"Incorporation" theory. 36 The essence of incorporation was easily
stated:
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored
and favored, as well as those who opposed its submission and
passage, persuades me that one of the objects that the provisions
of the Amendment's first section, separately and as a whole, were
intended to accomplish and make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states. . . .I would follow what I believe was the original
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the peo130. Id. at 10. See also note 127 supra.
131. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
132. See note 100 supra.
133. BLACK, supra note 82, at 10-11. See also the sources set out in note 107 supra.
134. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the JudicialFunction, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 467, 469
(1967).
135. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
136. For purposes of this note, Professor Robert Cushman's definition of incorporation
will be used. He defines it to mean "the application against the states, through due process,
of a 'right' exactly as the Bill of Rights applies 'right' against the federal government."
Cushman, Incorporation: Due Processand the Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 467, 472
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Cushman].
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ple of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.' 3 7
The incorporation standard was formulated as an alternative to
the "ordered liberty" concept of due process. Focusing on the fundamental fairness of a proceeding, the "ordered liberty" formula treated
due process as a generalized guarantee of decency and fair play and
emphasized the importance of the factual setting. 13 8 The Court had
said that this concept of due process forbade state conduct which was
shocking to the judicial conscience. 139 Being possessed of a conscience
which was easily shocked, 140 however, Justice Black was appalled at
the inconsistent and idiosyncratic results the Court was prepared to accept under this standard. 14 He thought it transformed the Constitution's guarantee of certain and equal justice under law into an
uncertain and potentially unequal "justice" according to the unpredictable whims of a given panel of judges. 142
The aim of Justice Black's Adamson opinion was to discredit the
"ordered liberty" standard and the opportunities it presented for the
Court to introduce subjective theories of natural law. He specifically
objected to the implicit assumption that the Court "can determine
what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so
to what degree."' 143 Justice Black believed that the Court was absolutely without power to determine what constituted due process because that decision had been made by the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" "Due process" and "fair trial" were appealing but imprecise terms. Justice Black felt that the very imprecision of the phrase
137. 332 U.S. at 71-72, 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1943); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); andthe concurring opinions of Justice Frankfurter in
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Malinski v. New York. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
The best discussion of the influences and aspects of the "ordered liberty" formula is B.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921).
139. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
140. Cahn, Justice Black and the FirstAmendment '4bsolutes'" A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 563 (1962).
141. This response was not confined to Justice Black. Even the member of the Court
most wedded to the fundamental fairness concept, Justice Felix Frankfurter, could be dismayed by its applications. See his dissenting opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
142-49 (1954). Professor Cushman said that "the move toward incorporation was, in part, at
least, a revolt against obvious and enduring injustice." Cushman, supra note 136, at 498.
142. Cushman, supra note 136, at 492. For confirmation of this thesis, compare Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) with Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). Justice
Black said that the fundamental fairness test "willfully throws away the certainty and security that lies in a written constitution, one that does not alter with a judge's health, belief, or
his politics." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
143. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
144. Id. See also the sources set out at note 158 infra.
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"due process" should be sufficient to persuade the court to avoid elevating this term of art into a constitutional doctrine:
The pragmatic government-fearing authors of our Constitution
and Bill of Rights did not, and I think wisely did not, use such
vague, indefinite, and elastic language. Instead, they provided
. . . clear, emphatic guarantees. . . . The explicit commands of
the Constitution provide a full description of the kind of 'fair
trial' the Constitution guarantees, and in my judgment that document leaves no room
for judges either to add or subtract from
145
those commands.

This factor of certainty, however, is both the greatest strength and
the most obvious weakness of incorporation. The benefits of predictability are offset by the disadvantages of restricted application. Yet this
appearance of inflexibility is only partially accurate. Indeed, one objection to the incorporation theory was that it promoted a warped and
an unduly narrow construction of the due process clause's potential for
the evolutionary expansion that some judges thought was the primary
worth of that provision. 146 Justice Black disagreed:
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket'. . . . Its provisions may be thought outdated
abstractions by some. And it is true that they were designed to
meet ancient evils. But they are the same kind of human evils
that have emerged from century to century wherever excessive
power is sought by the few at the expense of many. In my judgment the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a
Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced and respected so as to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices and
practices which might thwart these purposes. I fear to see the
consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the language of the
Bill of Rights as its point
of departure in interpreting and enforc147
ing that Bill of Rights.
Justice Black firmly believed that the Constitution had made all
the fundamental policy decisions regarding the allocation of power
within the three branches of government. The function of the Judiciary
within this constitutional framework is to apply and effectuate the values specified by the Framers when it adjudicates cases and controversies. Judicial action is proper only when it promotes the values of the
Constitution. In all instances where laws do not run afoul of the values
of the Constitution, the judicial impulse to act must yield to a pair of
145. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
146. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
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countervailing values of equal weight 48 -the right of the people to
govern themselves 149 and the right of the States to legislate according to
their own ideas of fairness, wisdom, and desirability in all areas save
those denied by the Constitution. 50 Justice Black specifically commented on this point: "The liberty of government by the people, in my
opinion, should never be denied by this Court except where the decision of the people as stated in laws passed by their chosen representatives, conflicts with the express or necessarily implied commands of our
Constitution."''
Although Justice Black believed that the Judiciary lacked the
power to alter or replace existing constitutional values, he did not think
that every instance of creative judicial action should be rejected. When
dealing with constitutional restrictions on governmental power, Justice
Black thought that, if a constitutional principle was clear, the Judiciary
was obligated to modernize its application in order to preserve its vitality.' 52 For example, Justice Black repeatedly voted to uphold the confi-

dentiality of membership files of protected associations in order to
prevent the curtailment of freedom of speech and assembly.' 53 This
position of enunciating new constructions and applications of a specific
provision while respecting the Constitution's values permitted a certain
degree of flexibility provided it was strictly confined to vindicating the
goals of the Constitution. 5 4 A former clerk to Justice Black summarized this position in the following formula: "The safeguard comes into
' 55
play whenever the danger it was designed to prevent is present."'
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 385 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 384. See also note 166 infra.
381 U.S. at 513.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 385 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
BLACK, supra note 82, at 14-20; Reich, The Living Constitution andthe Court'sRole,
in HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT, 138-42 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
153. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black, J., concurring);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1962) (city
ordinance forbidding distribution of unsigned handbills struck down on First Amendment
grounds in an opinion by Justice Black).
154. "[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are
constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the
meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which,
after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (emphasis in original).
155. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in Huao BLACK AND THE
SUPREME COURT 140 (S. Strickland ed. 1967). This article, read in conjunction with his
earlier work, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. Rnv. 673 (1963),
constitutes the most penetrating analysis of Justice Black's jurisprudence.
It should be noted that Professor Reich, a former clerk to Justice Black, used language
in these articles which would appear to attribute a more expansive operation to Justice
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The crucial idea was that this growth factor is distinguishable from natural law and substantive due process because it is directed by and re56
stricted to the values of the Framers embodied in the Bill of Rights.1
The corollary of this concept, one often overlooked, is that because
these values are of constitutional origin, they are not subject to a judicial process of addition or substitution.' 57 For Justice Black, the Bill of
Rights was not a mere enumeration of suggestions as to what due process might incorporate. He considered it the conclusive agenda of legitimate judicial activity. The substantive content of the first eight
amendments was not simply an illustration of due process; they were
exhaustive. 5 8
It was not until Griswold that Justice Black's corollary, the idea
that the Constitution was designed to address only a finite number of
"ancient evils," became apparent. 159 Subsequent cases made it clear
that Justice Black was prepared to tolerate many practices of which he
disapproved because they were known to the Framers and yet not
banned by the Constitution as written. 60 The upshot of this interpretation was that the Constitution, by itself, could not (and if Justice Black
Black's adaptations of constitutional provisions than does this note. Reich's 1967 article is
largely a recapitulation of his 1963 effort, yet it makes no mention of Justice Black's Griswold dissent. While 1967 was perhaps too soon to appreciate the divergence in attitudes
revealed by Griswold and the increasing frequency with which his mentor would be at odds
with the rest of the Court, Reich admitted in 1977 that his interpretation "goes beyond
Justice Black's own views, and instead suggests what might be learned from his opinions."
Reich, Foreword- Mr. Justice Black as One Who Saw the Future, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 845
(1977).
It bears emphasizing that Justice Black's antipathy to natural law was limited to his
abiding belief that it was an element that should not, but invariably would, work its way into
the judicial calculus brought to bear in due process cases. No evidence exists that he disagreed with much of the substance attributed to natural law and he occasionally would
make an inadvertent use of language that suggested that he too confused normative attitudes
with the substance of constitutional provisions. See, e.g., his concurring opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 67 (1961) where he referred to the "inalienable right to
speak." Justice Black was not opposed to natural law per se, only its use by the judiciary.
Decker, Justice Hugo L Black: The Balancer fAbsolutes, 59 CAL. L. Rav. 1335, 1351-52
(1971).
156. See, e.g., Justice Black's construction of the Commerce Clause for an example of
how this factor of adaptation worked in practice. BLACK, supra note 82, at 9.
157. 381 U.S. at 509. See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 741 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1967) (Black, J., concurring).
158. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 114 (1970); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377
(1970); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
159. See note 84 supra.
160. E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (capital punishment not cruel and unusual within meaning of the Eighth Amendment because
contemplated by Framers); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (wiretapping not forbidden by Fourth Amendment because Justice Black equated it
with common law nuisance known to, but not banned by, Framers); Berger v. New York,
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had his way, in the Court's hands it would not) provide a cure for every
problem which might come before the Court. Consider his statement
in Berger v. New York, a Fourth Amendment case decided two years
after Griswold:
[A] constitution like ours is not designed to be a full code of laws
.... And if constitutional provisions require new rules and
sanctions to make them as fully effective as might be desired, my
belief is that that calls for action, not by us, but by Congress or
state legislatures,
vested with powers to choose between conflict16 1
ing values.
Justice Black's construction clearly holds that the Constitution
cannot provide remedies for every problem which a dynamic society is
bound to produce. Justice Black was aware that this conceptualization
contained an element of internal tension between some of the Constitution's more general and idealized statements and the specific relief it
could provide for problems not within reach of its plain language. Yet
Justice Black felt that this inherent tension should not necessarily be
viewed as a weakness: it was consciously fostered by the Framers in
order to diffuse power among the three branches. 162 The doctrine of
the separation of powers was intended to preclude the accumulation of
unrestrained power in any single branch of government. Justice Black
was not prepared to have the Court systematically frustrate this policy
by holding itself out as the national problem-solver so as to accommodate an increasingly common belief "that the Supreme Court will reach
a faster and more desirable resolution of our problems than the legislative or executive branches."' 6 3 The ease with which judges could succumb to these blandishments only heightened the dangers. Justice
Black insisted that if the Judiciary stood fast, disappointed litigants
388 U.S. 41, 71-72 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 677 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (poll taxes).
161. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 88 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Accord, Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 261 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 397 (1970). Chief Justice Marshall held a similar view:
"The Constitution. . .was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse of power
which may be committed by the State governments." Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830). See also notes 223-24 and accompanying text infra.
It is true that in his dissenting opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 574 (1946),
Justice Black had said that "where a federally protected right has been invaded the federal
courts will provide the remedy to rectify the wrong done." This remark, however, was made
in the context of malapportioned legislatures, a situation that called for unusual judicial
action because the normal democratic processes were not functioning. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Black andLegalPositivism, 57 VA. L. REV. 375, 405 n.147 (1971). This was not the case
in Connecticut. See 381 U.S. at 531 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting). And of course this position
assumes the very point Justice Black denied in his Griswolddissent-that a legal wrong had
been suffered.
162. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
163. BLACK, supra note 82, at 11.
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would be compelled to resort to the other branches of government. In
this manner, the very gap between expectations and actuality would
spur the people to seek remedies from the organs intended by the Constitution to produce them, namely, Congress and the state legislatures.
It is likely that Justice Black accepted the idea that the Constitution might only declare a goal without specifying how it might be secured. In such a case, the situation might arise where the Court could
discern a new constitutional policy, privacy for instance, without having a way to make the "right" viable. Unlike some other justices, Justice Black was able to confront and accept the apparent anomaly of a
violated right which had no judicial remedy. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named- gents of the FederalBureau ofNarcotics,M he refused to sanction the judicial creation of a common law action against federal officers for Fourth Amendment violations because it conflicted with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Framers had insisted on this policy and its existence was therefore sufficient to prevent contravening
judicial actions. In addition, the mere existence of congressional power
to determine the rules by which the government could be sued was sufficient to convince Justice Black that this power could not be exercised
concurrently by the Judiciary.' 6 5
Justice Black believed that the subjective nature of substantive due
process demeans the democratic urge-the paramount value of the
Constitution' 6 6 -and discourages the people from utilizing those organs of government which best accommodate the changing needs of the
people. Set against this value, Justice Black was unmoved by the
Court's declarations that it was merely advancing the Framers' intent
when it struck down "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" laws which did not
infringe upon any specific constitutional provision. 6 7 He thought that
164. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
165. This interpretation might explain Justice Black's inability to develop and apply a
consistent rationale for the exclusionary rule. Although in 1961 he called it a constitutional
commandment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring), he earlier
treated it as a mere rule developed by the Court pursuant to its rulemaking power over the
federal courts, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (Black, J., concurring), a position he
subsequently readopted. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
For an excellent discussion of Justice Black's contradictory views about the rule, see
Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453
(1976).
166. Justice Black made this point explicit speaking for the court in one of the landmark
malapportionment decisions: "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which. . . we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if [it] is undermined." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17 (1964). See also note 167 infra.
167. "It can be. . .argued that when this Court strikes down a legislative act because it
offends the idea of 'fundamental fairness,' it furthers the basic thrust of our Bill of Rights by
protecting individual freedom. But that argument ignores the effect of such decisions on
perhaps the most fundamental individual liberty of our people-the right of each man to
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due process produced ad hoc decisions which were depenspecific factual situations. Justice Black was firmly conthis process operated more like the policy selection done by
and that it had no resemblance to the interpretation and

application of the law that should characterize the judicial function. 168

Legislation comes before the Court with the respect intrinsic in the
electoral authority of its creators. Justice Black felt that no similar le-

gitimacy sustains the acts of judges who are appointed for life. At best,
the law-making efforts of judges are suspect because of their institutional limitations. 169 At worst, as it appeared to Justice Black, they are
flatly forbidden by the Constitution. 7 ' As Paul Freund has observed,

the Justice believed that law, especially constitutional law, was and
should be the "clean instrument of popular will, not.
judges' gloss."''

. .

the patina of

C. Summary
The Court in Griswold was seeking to extend the frontiers of personal liberty by preserving a sphere of privacy for the individual. The
Court felt that this was a value desirable in and of itself. Hence there

was no requirement that privacy promote a specific constitutional provision. Justice Black was not unsympathetic to this motivation; 172 however, he could not join the majority. His fundamental disagreement
with the Court's action was his insistence that desirability alone cannot
mandate or legitimize a judicially-created "right" of constitutional stat-

ure. A judicial belief that important and meritorious concepts were not
receiving appropriate recognition by the elected lawmakers was insufficient, in Justice Black's view, to overcome two obstacles: the values of
participate in the self-government of his society." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384-85
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
168. See note 100 supra.
169. 381 U.S. at 519. The institutional deficiencies of the Judiciary were a concern to
Justice Black throughout his tenure. "Legislatures, under our system, determine the necessity for regulatory laws, considering both the evil and the benefits that may result. Unless
prohibited by constitutional limitations, their decisions as to policy are final. In weighing
conflicting arguments on the wisdom of legislation they are not confined within the narrow
boundaries of a particular controversy between litigants. Their inquiries are not subject to
the strict rules of evidence which have been found essential in proceedings before courts.
Legislators may personally survey the field and obtain data and a broad perspective which
the necessary limitations of court litigation make impossible." Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S.
5, 15 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). See also sources cited in note 280 infra.
170. Id. at 513.
171. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the JudicialFunction, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 467, 473
(1967).
172. "[Tihe law is every bit as offensive to me as it is [to] my Brethren ....
There is no
single one of the graphic and eloquent strictures and criticisms fired at... this Connecticut
law. . . to which I cannot subscribe." 381 U.S. at 507.
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the Constitution are fixed as of the time and understanding of the
Framers;1 73 and the general rule that legislatures have plenary power to
govern society within the restrictions of specific provisions of the Constitution.' 74 This fixity of content provides a predictability which is the
surest safeguard of the people's liberties. 1 75 Furthermore, it is a predictability which does not require rigidity from any branch of government save the Judiciary. Justice Black believed that the only flexibility
required of the Judiciary was its sensitivity for protecting those values
set forth in the Constitution. 76 In all other areas, innovation must be
left to the elected lawmakers. The creation of new values and, to a
lesser extent, some measure of their enforcement, 7 7 are given over to
the people and their chosen representatives to decide. Should the people, as the ultimate source of authority, wish to accord privacy an increased amount of protection, their recourse is to the legislatures and
the amendment process of Article V.
Substantive due process is an open invitation for judges to usurp
the lawmaking function.' 78 This usurpation becomes apparent when
the courts declare new values and elevate them to the status of implied
constitutional "rights." The judicial creation of this type of right
threatens to provoke a political backlash by an aroused citizenry that
could endanger expressly enumerated rights and the existence of judicial review. It also deprives government of the right and the power to
legislate in all areas except those prohibited by the Constitution. This
power to define and create rights is nothing less than judges granting
themselves the lawmaking power to "roam at will in the limitless area
of their own beliefs." 179 Justice Black was under no illusion as to the
expansive nature of this power: when judges are no longer bound by
the plain language of the Constitution, the "limitation upon their using
is language and history that are the crucial factors which influence me in inter173. "[I]t
preting the Constitution-not reasonability or desirability as determined by the justices of
the Supreme Court." BLACK, supra note 82, at 8. "It is only through sensitive attention to
the specific words, the context in which they are used, and the history surrounding the adoption of those provisions that the true meaning of the Constitution can be discerned." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113 (1970). In his Adamson dissent, Justice Black quoted
Justice Samuel Miller to support his belief that this was the correct rule of constitutional
interpretation. Said Justice Miller. "It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of
the Constitution. . .we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the condition of the
men who framed that instrument." Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), citedat 332 U.S. at
72.
174. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 385 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
175. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393-94 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
176. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 161 & 165 and accompanying text supra.
178. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
179. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 91 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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the natural law due process philosophy to strike down any state law

dealing with any activity whatever, will obviously be only self-im-

posed."' 8 0
The core of Mr. Justice Black's constitutional jurisprudence-the
belief that the office he held imposed constraints on his personal
desires-was set forth in Griswold: "I like my privacy as well as the
next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some constitutional provision."' 8 He felt that the Griswold majority, as reflected in the common
element of the concurrences, could not conceal the mephitic resurrection of substantive due process despite their sentimental and lyrical beatitudes about the worth of privacy.

IV.

Post-Griswold Privacy Developments

Prior to his retirement, Justice Black was involved in only one
other case involving a privacy argument similar to that of Estelle Griswold." 2 His objections to the right of privacy remain valid however,
and their impact on the Court can only be evaluated in light of subsequent developments in the privacy area.
Justice Black called privacy "a broad, abstract and ambiguous
180. 381 U.S. at 524.
181. Id. at 5 10. Two years later, Justice Black made the same point in a somewhat different form: "[It may be that those who wrote the Constitution would have done better to
provide the federal courts with the power to substitute their choice of constitutional values
for the choice made by the Constitution itself. Even were I able to agree that this is true,
however, I still could not accept it consistently with my oath to support the Constitution.
That oath means to me that I should support the Constitution as written, not as revised by
the Supreme Court from time to time." BLACK, supra note 82, at 42.
Justice Black was not a preceptor who lacked either the courage or the consistency to be
an exemplar: remaining unconvinced of privacy's constitutional status, he abjured its use
even when it might have bolstered his position. An apt illustration was his dissent in Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968)
(Black, J., dissenting). Disputing the majority's ruling that the First Amendment prohibited
the owner of a shopping center from preventing the peaceful picketing of his property incidental to a labor dispute because the property was generally open to the public, Justice
Black scrupulously avoided reference to the privacy interests of the owner, despite the obvious oblique support it would have given to his position. Id. at 327-33. The Supreme Court
adopted this position one year after Justice Black's death and largely repudiated the Logan
Valley decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
182. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In light of the subsequent decision in the
abortion cases, it is interesting to note that Justice Black had a decisive role in one case that
must be treated as a near miss. In United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), Justice Black
wrote the opinion in a five to four division that upheld the District of Columbia's abortion
statute against a charge of vagueness. In concluding his opinion, he was at some pains to
avoid the contention that the law was void for its intrusion upon the Griswold-like privacy
interests. Id. at 72-73.
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concept."' 8 3 He felt that such a nebulous and ill-defined entity, when
conjoined with the underlying dynamic of substantive due process, created a license for judicial action which could "easily be interpreted as a
constitutional ban against many things."' 4 Time has vindicated this
fear. This section will demonstrate that privacy has become a judicial
term of art and that Griswold, as its fountainhead, has been cited as
authority for results which often appear to have minimal connection
with the common understanding of the concept of privacy.
Despite the Griswold majority's repeated references to privacy
within the context of the marital relationship, Justice Black recognized
that the Court was, in reality, announcing a right of privacy which belonged to individuals. 8 5 Later cases verify the accuracy of this interpretation. The Court's opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird made it quite
explicit that the right to privacy was not dependent on status: "It is true
that in Griswoldthe right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. . . .[Yet, i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. ... 6
In 1921, Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals noted
the "tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic."187
The expansive logic of Griswold reached its zenith in Roe v. Wade.'
The subject under review in Roe was a Texas statute which made it a
crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion for any purpose
other than to save the life of the mother. By a seven to two vote, the
Court held the law unconstitutional. The core of this holding was the
premise that the right of personal privacy enunciated in Griswold "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 8 9
Roe is remarkable from several perspectives. First, it intimated
that the right of privacy is a comprehensive guarantee of liberty incorporating many aspects of a right to make certain important decisions
183. 381 U.S. at 509.
184. Id.
185. 381 U.S. at 508.
186. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original). In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), the Court upheld the right to possess allegedly obscene material within the confines
of a private residence. The Court saw its decision as simply acknowledging the First
Amendment's protection for an individual's "right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home." Id. at 565.
187. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (192 1). See also the simi-

lar statements of Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
355 (1908) and Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448, 450 (1909).
188. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe should be read in conjunction with its companion case,
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
189. 410 U.S. 113, 153.
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affecting the quality of life each person may select or pursue. 190 Pri-

vacy was now something more than Justice Brandeis' "right to be let

alone." 19 ' It was evolving into a constitutional term of art describing a
constellation of amenities, privileges, and immunities deemed integral
aspects of a sphere of private autonomy that was beyond arbitrary state
interference. 9 2 Second, Roe was the first qualitative example of a
Supreme Court decision founded directly upon the right of privacy. As

such it was the first genuine extension of the substantive aspects of pri-

vacy in the eight years following Griswold. 93 Other cases in the interim had cited Griswold but had not been controlled by it. 194 Third, in
addition to confirming Justice Black's belief that a right of privacy
might lead to some unexpected results, 195 Roe also confirmed Justice
Black's prophecy that the right would ultimately be recognized as
originating in the due process clause. Until 1973, the source of the right
to privacy remained uncertain. Only two opinions cited Griswold in
contexts where the privacy interests of specific amendments were inad190. The Court in Roe interpreted a number of cases decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment as illustrations of this decisional aspect of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to seek contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (right to select a marriage partner); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(right to control family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right not
to have the state arbitrarily or discriminatorily impair procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to direct the education and rearing of children). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.26. (1977).
191. The phrase was first used by Thomas Cooley, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
It was later adopted by Brandeis and Warren in their famous article, The Right to Privacy,4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890), and subsequently figured prominently in Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927).
192. For a detailed exposition of what the most privacy-oriented member of the Court
considered to be the full breadth and diversity of matters encompassed by the term, see Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); and Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579
(1978).
193. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), is excluded from this category because it
was predominantly a free speech case. The fact that Justice Black was able to join the majority in Stanley indicates that he agreed with Justice Marshall's opinion that "[i]f the First
Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch." Id. at 565
(emphasis added). Had he felt that the issue of free speech was not sufficient to reach this
result, it is unlikely that he would have accepted without protest the opinion's references to
Griswold.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is also excluded because it only marginally
extended the same aspect of the privacy right-access to contraceptives-dealt with in Griswold. Eisenstadt is also explainable purely as an equal protection issue.
194. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
195. The reductio ad absurdem he held out was the possibility that the Court's logic
meant that privacy could be used to permit the Court to judge the fairness of any criminal
law, on the rationale that every such law involves some curtailment of "liberty." 381 U.S. at
518.
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equate for resolution of the case, and neither clarified the issue: one
had largely used the Douglas opinion, 196 while the other found the

right within the nebulous realms of the Ninth Amendment. 197 Roe,
although not free from ambiguity, indicated the Court's distinct preference for the due process clause:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as wefeel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass 198
a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.

The fourth notable feature of Roe is the similarity of the dissents in
that case to Justice Black's Griswold opinion. The dissenting opinions
of Justices White and Rehnquist adopted the substantive objections as
well as the language of Justice Black. 199 While Justice Black attacked
the Griswold majority's failure to adhere to the meaning of the Constitution as written,2 °" Justice Rehnquist stated that the subject of the Roe
decision was "not 'private' in the ordinary use of that word."' 20 ' The

"unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of

legislative enactments" 20 2 feared by Justice Black in 1965 had jumped
the narrow factual setting of Griswold and sanctioned the Court eight
years later to undertake what Justice
White termed an extravagant ex20 3
ercise of "raw judicial power."
196. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972).
197. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
198. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). Accord, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23
(1977). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976), where the Court divided the
constitutional interests of privacy into those "'zones of privacy'. . . created by more specific constitutional provisions," and spoke of the remainder as those which "deal generally
with substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment."
199. Compare Justice Black: "I do not believe that we are granted power by the Due
Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no
justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of 'civilized standards of conduct.'
Such an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not
the power to interpret them." 381 U.S. at 513 (footnote omitted) with Justice White: "I find
no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. .

.

.This issue, .

.

. should be left with the people and to the political

processes the people have devised to govern their affairs." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) andJustice Rehnquist: "[T]he Court's opinion. . . is far more
appropriate to a legislative judgment than to a judicial one. .

.

.The decision here

...

partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. 381 U.S. at 509.
201. 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. 381 U.S. at 521.
203. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). See note 118 supra.
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The decision in Roe was founded upon the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This recognition by the Court that its action had no basis in any explicit language of the Constitution tacitly
conceded Justice Black's central thesis-that privacy was a judicially
created right. The abortion cases were acknowledged to be substantive
due process by Justices Douglas and Stewart, the two members of the
Court most qualified to confirm posthumously Justice Black's opinion
as to the true nature and source of the right to privacy. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, contrary to his position in Griswold,2" made
no attempt to rely upon the penumbra theory's tenuous moorings to the
Bill of Rights. Instead, the author of Griswold returned to his earlier
view that privacy was a20 component
of "liberty" within the meaning of
5
the due process clause.
Justice Stewart also conceded that the Roe decision was motivated
by substantive due process.2 °6 Yet Justice Stewart, the sole remaining
Griswold dissenter and the one person who would be most expected to
protest at the expansion of the privacy concept, also joined the majority
in Roe. His concurring opinion was a surprising recantation of his opposition to substantive due process. 20 7
If any ambiguity remained after Roe, the Court's decision in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland"' dispelled all doubts as to the nature
and source of privacy. In Moore, the Court struck down as violative of
due process a municipal zoning ordinance which limited the residents
of a home to certain members of a single family. The constitutional
infirmity arose because the law's definition of "family" created classifications that made it a criminal offense for Mrs. Moore to live with two
grandsons if they were cousins but not if they were brothers. The
Court felt that the city's aim of preventing overcrowding could not be
promoted by "slicing into the family itself. ' 20 9 Although the city could
limit the number of unrelated individuals living within a single dwelling,21o itcould not make criminal the living arrangements of related
persons whether undertaken by choice or by necessity. The decision is
important to the present analysis not so much for its precise holding
but for what the Court said about the nature and the source of privacy
204. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
205. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,211,216, 220 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); PUC v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
206. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
207. Justice Stewart has subsequently shown himself to be the member of the Court who
may be the most discriminating in its use. Compare Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 536-41 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting), with Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,39196 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
208. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
209. Id. at 498.
210. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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as a constitutional right. After a dozen years of grappling with Griswold and its progeny, the plurality opinion represents an explicit and
complete vindication of Justice Black's belief that privacy was based
upon substantive due process. The opinion also acknowledged that his
fears were well founded:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for
this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the
guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As
the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reasonfor
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become
the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members
of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint.
21
Even more remarkable for its candor was the soul-searching dissent of Justice White. Although he was unwilling to renounce completely the substantive due process utilized in Griswold, he discussed
the objections of Justice Black with the air of one who seeks counsel
from the past in order to resolve the problems of the present. Like his
brethren of the majority, Justice White was under no illusions as to the
perils that the doctrine of substantive due process posed to the courts
and the democratic system:
The Judiciary, including this court, is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present
construction of the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers . . . the Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still
further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to
strike down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its
welfare. Whenever the Judiciary does so, it unavoidably preempts for itself another part of the governance
of the country
21 2
without express constitutional authority.
Chief Justice Burger along with Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
also filed separate dissents. The Chief Justice did not discuss the difficult constitutional question of privacy, although he had previously indicated an awareness of the nature and the magnitude of the
underlying problem.21 3 Justice Stewart believed that no constitutionally protected interest was involved and that the Court's decision was
211. 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
213. In an earlier case, the Chief Justice had recognized that the Griswold privacy concept presented the dangerous opportunity for judges to pass "into the uncircumscribed area
of personal predilections," the upshot of which would find the Court attempting to "seriously invade the constitutional prerogatives of the states and regrettably hark back to the
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prompted more by the potential for inequitable application than by the
ordinance's incompatibility with the Constitution. 14 Justice Relnquist, who has been the Court's most consistent opponent of the privacy concept, 2 15 concurred in Justice Stewart's dissent.
Moore is a notable substantive due process case primarily because
a majority of the Court, despite acknowledging that Justice Black's objections were supported by past experience and by the Constitution's
plain language, still refused to abandon its use. While acknowledging
that the history of the Court's maladroit use of substantive due process
"counsels caution and restraint," the plurality opinion went on to say
21 6
that that history "does not counsel abandonment."
Although Moore exhibits the present Court's unwillingness to accept Justice Black's absolute rule of judicial abstention as constitutionally mandated, recent cases indicate that it may be backing away from
substantive due process for another reason. As a matter of discretionary action, the Court has evinced a disinclination to bring itself into
direct conflict with the political branches over some components of the
privacy concept. Justice Black would not have admitted such a distinction could exist because his devotion to the separation of powers created a starkly defined constitutional system of Manichean simplicity: a
court either had complete power or it had no power. 2 17 Nevertheless,
the implicit conclusion of the recent case of Maher v. Roe2" 8 and its
companion cases 2 19 is that the Court has begun to curb judicial enforcement of the expansive logic of the Griswold-Roe right of privacy.
The facts of these recent abortion cases were quite similar: all involved women contending that the states were required to pay for their
nontherapeutic abortions. Maher held that a state which participates in
the Medicaid program is not required by Title XIX of the Social Securdays of substantive due process." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 472, 467 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
214. 431 U.S. at 537-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
215. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAs L. REV. 693 (1976).
Justice Rehnquist has on at least one occasion used the privacy arguments of past majorities to needle his brethren with charges of inconsistently applying the concept. Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is
remarkable that when he does urge that a privacy argument be sustained, he does so without
approving of the doctrine or retreating from his long-standing opposition.
216. 431 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion).
217. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 867 (1960). For Justice Black's
views on the doctrine of the separation of powers, see note 101 and accompanying text
supra.
218. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
219. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
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ity Act 220 to use state or federal funds to furnish a woman the opportunity to secure an abortion. Clarifying the decision in Roe, the sixmember majority said that "Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion,"' but only that the privacy right merely
"protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her
freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."' 22' This result
comprehends several important doctrinal components.
The first and most important feature of Maher was its return to the
belief that the predominant responsibility for the resolution of controversies regarding social policy is entrusted to the legislative and executive branches. The Court declined to establish itself as the policy
maker of first or even last resort. The topic of abortion is fraught with
conflicting opinions from such diverse fields as medicine, theology, sociology, philosophy and, ultimately, penology. In such a situation, the
policy of judicial nonintervention expressed in Ferguson v. Skrupa 222 is
clearly the preferred course:
[W]hen an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature. We should not forget that 'legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts.' 2 3
The vanguard of public affairs is an inappropriate focus of judicial activism, and one not specified by the fundamental law: "the Constitution does 4not require ajudicially imposed resolution of [such] difficult
' '22
issues.
Griswold,together with Roe, established privacy as a fundamental
225
right which could be abridged only by a compelling state interest.
Yet Maher stands for the proposition that a policy decision produced in
the political arena, even if it affects the exercise of a fundamental right,
will be sustained if it is rationally related to a constitutionally permissible purpose and, collaterally, involves a governmental power with a
"textually demonstrable commitment. . . to a coordinate political de220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (1970).
221. 432 U.S. at 473-74.
222. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
223. 432 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,
270 (1904)). Compare this passage with the remarks of Justice White in Doe v. Bolton: "In a
sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may easily
and heatedly differ. . .I can find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of
priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. . . .This issue. . . should be left with
the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs." 410
U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
224. 432 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). Accord, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972). See also note 161 and accompanying text supra.
225. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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partment. ' ' 226 Within the context of Maher, this collateral consideration was the legislature's authority to determine policy priorities in
conjunction with its spending power. The Court's deference to legislative control over the allocation of fiscal resources has, in effect, almost
elevated the States'
authority over expenditures to the status of a com227
pelling interest.
In Maher, the Court reiterated that Roe held that a woman's privacy right to an abortion was not absolute in every circumstance. 228
The right to decide whether to have an abortion in the first three
months of pregnancy was absolute and the state could not erect an absolute obstacle to the free exercise of that right.22 9 But the mere fact
that this right was declared to be a constituent part of the fundamental
right of personal privacy "implies no limitation on the authority of a
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion," 30
that is, for the state to make bringing the pregnancy to term "a more
attractive alternative . . . [and one] consonant with legislative policy."2 3 ' Consequently the state can use its broad discretionary power
' 233
over expenditures 232 to encourage a "preferred course of conduct.
Prior to Maher, the Court had recently acknowledged that the
states' police power is, in essence, the power to legislate morality. Legislation is an appropriate outlet for the "'right of the Nation and the
States to maintain a decent society.' "234 It is legitimate for legislatures
to attempt to set "'the tone of the society, the mode. . . the style and
quality of life, now and in the future.' "235 If such legislative efforts
"reflect unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people," 23 6
this empirical uncertainty alone does not justify a stricter standard of
226. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
227. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).

Legislative decisions which do not facially prohibit or create insurmountable barriers to the
exercise of fundamental rights have, when linked to the state's wide latitude in "choosing
among competing demands for limited public funds," Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479
(1977), been evaluated by the less exacting rational relation test. Compare Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (right to
travel) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) with Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47

(1977) (right to marry).
228. 432 U.S. at 473; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
229. Carey v. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-75 (1976). Cf Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
230. 432 U.S. at 474.
231. Id. at 475.
232. See note 227 supra.

233. 432 U.S. at 477.
234. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
235. Id. at 59, (quoting Bickel in 22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25-26 (1971). Cf Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).
236. 413 U.S. 49, 62, 69.
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judicial scrutiny; the usual presumption of constitutionality is operative
and the legislation will be upheld if rationally related to a permissible
object of governmental attention.2 3 7
Maher did not renounce the fundamental right of privacy as an
abstract principle. However, the presumption of constitutionality and
its linkage to the deference traditionally accorded legislative choices in
the allocation of public funds did remove much of the efficacy of
Roe.23 8 When the Court refused to impose an affirmative obligation on
the political branches to subsidize the judicially created right, it was
returning to a large measure of the status quo before Roe. By failing to
insist that public funding operate to secure the right to an abortion, the
Court left it to legislatures to ponder the desirability of a society where
abortions are viable options only for those with the financial ability to
pay for them.
It should be noted that Maher contained three similarities to Justice Black's position. The first is the focus of the Court's inquiry. The
Maher opinion's undeviating attention to the issue of the state's power
to spend according to its own notions of wisdom is reminiscent of Justice Black's insistence that judicial review be limited to the sole question of power. Like Justice Black, the majority in Maher, despite the
anguished cries of the dissenters, 239 focused solely on whether the state
had the power, and did not concern itself with the effects of the exercise
of that power.
The second affinity is closely akin to the first. Maher was a tacit
reclassification of the right of privacy: it no longer constituted a fundamental right of equal dignity with expressly enumerated rights in all
contexts. Instead, the Court demonstrated that if the judicial inquiry
was limited to the issue of power, privacy was now one of the many
social and economic matters to which the compelling state interest test
was inapplicable, at least so long as the mere exercise of the right is not
prohibited. The scope of judicial review was thus detached from a subjective evaluation of the worth of a claimed right. Maher reaffirmed
the theory of judicial review expressed in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.2" The Court there said that the "undisputed importance" of a claimed privilege cannot figure in determining
237. 432 U.S. at 478-79.
238. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483-85 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 462-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. The tenor of Justice Blackmun's dissent is representative: "For the individual woman concerned, indigent and financially helpless, as the Court's opinions in the three cases
concede her to be, the result is punitive and tragic. Implicit in the Court's holdings is the
condescension that she may go elsewhere for her abortion. I find that disingenuous and
alarming, almost reminiscent of: 'Let them eat cake."' Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462
(1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
240. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the level of judicial review given a challenged law.24 1 This factor "will
not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing social and economic legislation. ' z42 Whatever the abstract
value of privacy, the Court hesitated to insist that it be respected when

the normal judicial posture of deference clashed with the plenary legislative power over appropriations.

The Court's deference points to the third similarity. Maher appears to illustrate the possibility mentioned in the previous section: the
Court might declare the existence of a fundamental right but the Constitution might deny the Court the power and the means to establish a
remedy to vindicate the right.24 3

V.

A Black Future for Privacy

It was noted in the introduction that the "right of privacy" is a
profoundly emotive phrase. 244 Its simple words exert an enormous attraction because they embody a precious concept which is viewed as

being increasingly imperiled. But the phrase is also a dangerous one,
for it "implies a value judgment that any invasion of that 'right' is
somehow wrong and should be resisted."2 4 5
The power of this phrase on the emotions may do much to explain
Griswold. By 1965, the Court was more inclined to view privacy as a
constitutional entity.246 At the same time, the Court accepted the fact

that continued inaction in defense of a constitutional right by the political branches might compel the Judiciary to act in an instance where it
might otherwise stay its hand.2 47 Griswold synthesized these two concerns and created a value the Court believed was receiving insufficient
241. Id. at 33-35.
242. Id. at 35; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977). Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238, 247 (1976): "[Tlhe question is not . . . whether the State can 'establish' a 'genuine
public need' for the specific regulation. It is whether [a challenge] can demonstrate that
there is no rational connection." (footnote omitted).
243. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
244. The concept of privacy has a special appeal because it is often equated with the
existence of a civilized society and personal freedom. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHTS
OF THE PEOPLE 90 (1958) ("Much of this liberty of which we boast comes down to the right
of privacy."); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 229
(1965) ("In modem terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."). See also A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-51 (1967).
245. McKay, The Right ofPrivacy. Emanationsand Intimations, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 259,
271-72 (1965). For a discussion of the destabilizing effects of such emotive phrases on
judges, see L. JAFFE, THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 101 (1969).
246. See, e.g., Murphy v. New York Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
247. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and especially the concurring opinion
of Justice Clark at 251-52.
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recognition from the political branches. Bluntly put, personal conviction became constitutional
compulsion: the Court created a right it
24 8
wanted to find.
The proponents of substantive due process argue that it serves a
useful purpose by furnishing the Court with a method whereby it may
strike down the infrequent examples of patently oppressive laws which
249
are not prohibited by the reach of specific constitutional provisions.
If due process is viewed as an evolutionary and idealistic concept with
a potency independent of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, Griswold
and other privacy cases such as Moore assume a coherent and identifiable pattern; without the authority of the Bill of Rights, the more obvious examples of substantive due process may be characterized by the
common denominator of the judiciary's
"sense of outrage produced by
250
official pressure on an individual."
One defender of substantive due process, Professor Thomas Grey,
poses the question, "Do we have an unwritten Constitution?, 251 The
answer is of course we do. But Professor Grey uses the word in the
English sense, to connote that body of implicit restrictions comprised of
custom and habit which, although unwritten, nevertheless operates as a
genuine restraint upon the State. Although numerous scholars consider
the informal restraints of societal norms absorbed into the Constitution,252 this sort of constitution with a small "c" was rejected by the
Framers and it has no legally cognizable force. 3 Its great danger is
that it denigrates the responsibility and responsiveness of modern legislators.
If the Griswold decision was premised upon the Court's belief that
privacy would not find adequate protection at the hands of the State,
time has proven the assumption erroneous. The Court's belief that
only the Judiciary, sheltered from the vicissitudes of the political arena
by life tenure, could or would protect privacy simply does not comport
with reality: the federal government and the several states have shown
themselves fully capable of responding to the people's demand that
their privacy be safeguarded. The announcement of a general constitu248. C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 686 (2d ed. 1968). As one commentator has phrased it, the Griswoldopinion was "longer on yearning than on substantive content." Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charterfor an Expanded Law of
Privacy?,64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965).
249. See, e.g., the concurring opinions of Justice Frankfurter in Louisiana exrel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947) and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947).
250. Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REv. 283, 287 (1965).
251. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
252. E.g., E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 86 (1957); H. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 9 (1925); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution
Mean *ihat it Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).
253. BLACK, supra note 82, at 3-7. See also notes 127-28 and accompanying text supra.
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tional right of privacy has not insulated Congress or prevented it from
responding to the wishes of the public by enacting numerous statutes
securing privacy in a variety of contexts.2 54 The Privacy Protection
Study Commission was established by Congress in 1974 and its report
on the formulation of a national privacy policy was recently submitted
to the President.2 55 In a supplementary vein, Griswold has not inhibited the states from more than equaling this legislative output.2 56 Nor
has it stopped state courts from developing a robust body of common
law remedies to protect an individual's privacy from intrusion by another.2 57 Subsequent to its decision in Griswold, the Supreme Court
followed this example by recognizing a cause of action for privacy violations by federal officers. 258 The conclusion to be drawn from these
official measures is that the emotive power of the right of privacy operates no less convincingly upon the people, and therefore upon their
elected representatives, than it does upon the Supreme Court. Since
"[m]odern man's vision of privacy will not fade away," 259 the normal
judicial posture of deference should have been followed in Griswold.
Immediately after the case was decided, one commentator forecast
that, "depending upon where the philosophy of Griswold leads, either
the case will gain a respected place in constitutional jurisprudence as
the progenitor of a new source of protection for 'fundamental personal
rights,' or it will be cast aside as a judicial experiment that proved un254. See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974); the
Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974); The Fair Credit
Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970).
255. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977).
256. The most obvious indication of the importance accorded privacy is the number of
states that have included a guarantee of privacy in their respective constitutions: ALAS.
CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. I,
§ 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
An exhaustive collection of constitutional provisions, statutes and cases was compiled in
the Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY, Appendix I, part 11 (1977). A representative sampling of these laws, illustrating the breadth and profusion of state privacy efforts, can be found in COMPILATION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS (R. Smith ed. 1976). Periodic updates are summarized
ii THE PRIVACY JOURNAL, a monthly publication sponsored in part by the American Civil
Liberties Union.
257. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
258. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). The Court has, however, declined to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal
common law tort remedy for defamation unless such an action is recognized by state law.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), rehearingdenied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
259. Gillmor, Black andthe Problem ofPrivacyin JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 91 (E. Dennis, D. Gillmor, & D. Grey eds. 1978).
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workable."26 It is time to cast Griswoldaside for the reasons specified
by Justice Black.
The stated rationale of Griswold is not persuasive. Apart from the
ex cathedrapronouncement that the right of privacy was "legitimate,"
the Court advanced no convincing reason why it was authorized to act
in the face of a presumptively legitimate and constitutional decision by
the legislature as to what Connecticut perceived to be sound public pol-

icy. Nor was the Court's action "rendered self-evident by intoning the
term 'fundamental.' "261
The genealogy is clear: Griswold begat Roe and Roe in turn begat
the "right to life" movement.2 62 The Court, confronted by the unrelenting and increasingly successful political pressure generated by

Roe's incursion into the legislative domain,2 63 has subsequently called
a halt to the onrush of the logic underlying the privacy principle. 2 4
The abortion funding cases indicate that the Court is unwilling to insist
that the political branches accept its designation of fundamental rights
as conclusive. The Court's opinions in these cases are suffused with the
awareness that "'the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies

for every social and economic ill,'

"265

and that recourse to properly

functioning political machinery is a viable and even preferable alternative to judicial action.26 6
260. McKay, The Right of Privacy. Emanationsand Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259,
271 (1965).
261. L. LUSKY, supra note 11, at 17.
262. See note 11 supra. The dissenters in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), took note of
these opponents when they spoke of "extraordinary pressure from well financed and carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns" and "elected leaders cower[ing] before public pressure," id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and the "demonstrated wrath and noise of the
abortion opponents." Id. at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263. Since 1976, Congress has, after lengthy and acrimonious debate, attached the socalled Hyde Amendment to the annual appropriation bill for the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. The amendment has allowed payment of federal funds for abortions in increasingly narrow circumstances. Compare Act of September 30, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976) with Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1977). Numerous lower court
decisions have declared the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
recently decided the issue and come to a contrary conclusion. Continuing the course it began with Maher and Beal, the five-man majority decided that the restrictions of the Hyde
Amendment did not violate concepts of equal protection contained in either the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendments. Harris v. McRae, 48 U.S.L.W. 4941 (June 1980); Williams v.
Zbaraz, 48 U.S.L.W. 4957 (June 1980).
264. See text accompanying notes 218-243 supra.
265. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972) (emphasis added)). See also note 161 and accompanying text supra.
266. "Although the Mayor's personal position on abortion is irrelevant to our decision,
we note that he is an elected official responsible to the people of St. Louis. His policy of
denying city funds for abortions such as that desired by Doe is subject to public debate and
approval or disapproval at the polls. We merely hold, for the reasons stated in Maher, that
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The Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland admitted that the
right of privacy is grounded in substantive due process.2 67 The next
logical step for the Court is to adopt a less imperialistic conception of
the judicial function. It would be well-advised to heed Justice Frankfurter's stricture that "[i]n a democratic society like ours, relief must
come through an aroused public conscience that sears the conscience of
the people's representatives., 68 Because the people are aroused and
because the people's representatives have shown that relief can come
from the democratic process, no reason exists for not leaving
the resolu2 69
tion of privacy-related issues to the political branches.
In addition to the abortion controversy, the reasoning of Griswold
is capable of producing further results which society might find intolerable. Although an obvious response to this problem is that constitutional rights are not and should not be dependent upon popular
approval, this answer does not resolve the internal contradiction that
political considerations impose on Griswold's operation. The Court set
out to protect only those aspects of privacy which are fundamental.
Overlooking the fact that the "right" was itself the creation of political
action by the Court, a right of privacy "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy 2 7v would
also appear broad enough to encompass the "right" to practice homosexuality, at least in private. Yet the Court has declined to make this
seemingly logical extension of privacy.2 7 '
These gaps in the coherent conceptualization and application of
the privacy principle only emphasize the importance of the role ofjudicial discretion in the area of fundamental rights. Without the concrete
guidance of specific constitutional provisions, the Court is thrown back
to its own estimations of which judicially designated fundamental
rights will comport with current public attitudes. Decisions of this nature cannot be made in a vacuum: the Court is constantly taking the
risk that it may turn a blind corner only to find the flow of public opinion moving in the opposite direction. Conversely, where public opinion is known to be hostile, as in the case of homosexuality, legal logic
may yield to political reality. 7 2 Thus conceived, the field of fundathe Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from
expressing a preference for normal childbirth as St. Louis has done." Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (footnote omitted). Accord,Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977).
267. See notes 208-16 and accompanying text supra.
268. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
269. This is qualified, of course, by withholding from legislative interference those privacy interests which are linked to specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
270. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
271. Doe v. Commonwealth Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425
U.S. 901 (1976) (constitutionality of Virginia's criminal statutes prohibiting sodomy and oral
copulation upheld as applied to private consensual conduct).
272. The Court is obviously constrained by the fact that its decisions command accept-
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mental rights has no boundaries except those that are self-imposed by

the Court when its political judgment persuades it to halt the ex-

panding logic of the privacy principle.27 3 This haphazard process is
proper and even commendable when practiced by the political
branches, but it is an unseemly approach for the courts to adopt.2 74
Justice Black appreciated the emotive force of the phrase "right to
privacy" and its impact upon judges. He also saw that its attractions
were rooted, not in the constitutional, but in the transcendental. 275 It
was because he recognized the evocative appeal of the words that he

objected so strenuously to their use by the Court in preference to the
language selected by the Framers of the Constitution. That instru-

ment's language contains policy decisions establishing values which are
not subject to judicial modification:
Courts have neither the right nor the power to review. . original decision[s] of the Framers and to attempt to make a different
evaluation of the importance of the rights granted in the Constitution. When confficting values exist in the field of individual
liberties protected by the Constitution, that document settles the
conflict, and its policy should not be changed without constitutional amendment by the people in the manner provided by the
people.2 76
The Court and the American polity have been ill-served by the
ance only to the extent it accords with society's beliefs or if opposition to the Court's actions
can be overcome by loyalty to the legitimacy of the Judiciary's role in our government. See
generally THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker ed. 1973); R. JOHNSON,
THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE (1967); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970).
273. Compare the majority opinion in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) with the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall. Id. at 100.
274. The hazards are increased once the Court goes beyond the mere enunciation of a
right or principle which may be supported by society and, under the compulsion of the
necessity of securing the right, feels obliged to deal with the incidents of the right, which
may not be acceptable. For example, the public may support the idea of integration or
privady but balk at busing or abortion. Yet this is inevitable unless the Court makes the
distinction between right and remedy. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
The unease increases when the Court's concern witl the details attending the exercise of
a right seem to find it wielding a line-item veto. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down a state law specifying surgical procedures to induce abortions).
275. "'A right of privacy in matters purely private is ... derived from natural law.'"
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194, 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1905)). The
Supreme Court of Georgia went on to describe privacy as a concept "which may be said to
arise out of those laws sometimes characterized as 'immutable,' 'because they are natural,
and so just at all times, and in all places, that no authority can either change or abolish
them.' It is one of those rights referred to by some law writers as 'absolute'...." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
276. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 879 (1960). Accord, Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
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creation of a general constitutional right of privacy. Resurrected out of
a fear that the other political branches would fail to protect the right (a
fear that was subsequently disproven), the doctrine lured the Court into
invalidating a score of state laws under the holding in Roe. The resulting political imbroglio typifies the Court's recurring tendency to suffer
from "self-inflicted wounds. 27 7
The conclusion that the Court has overreached itself will stand regardless of whether the Griswold doctrine is measured against either
Justice Black's concept of the judicial function, or the "ordered liberty"
standard outlined in Palko v. Connecticut. 8 Judged by the former, the
controversy roiling around the Court as a result of the privacy-abortion
cases is the inevitable consequence of the Court's usurpation of powers
constitutionally entrusted to the political branches. Measured by the
latter, the Court is presently under attack because it has consistently
misjudged its theoretical ability to mirror contemporary opinion and
also misinterpreted the public temper on the incidents accompanying
the privacy right in particular situations. 7 9 This accentuates the validity of Justice Black's belief that judges are not equipped, either institutionally28 0 or personally,2 8 ' to act as the diviners of society's prevailing
attitudes. In either case, the Court has2 82needlessly disparaged the political process and the democratic ethic.
277.

C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

50 (1928).

278. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
279. See note 274 supra.
280. The Court's lack of facilities to gather information was one of the reasons Justice
Black felt the Judiciary should avoid using substantive due process to second-guess legislative decisions. See note 169 supra. Accord, BLACK, supra note 82, at 30; Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 666, 678 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 519 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309
U.S. 176, 184 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U.S. 434,452 (1939) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See also R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 291 (1941).
281. Justice Black felt that all the talk about judges applying the '*collective conscience"
of society through the due process clause was disingenuous and "only a euphemism for an
'individual's' judgment. Judges are as human as anyone and as likely as others to see the
world thru [sic]
their own eyes and find the 'collective conscience' remarkably similar to
their own." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 n.6 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). Accord,
BLACK, supra note 82 at 12-14.
282. "And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are careless or evil, yet the
constitutional duty of the court remains untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect the
people, by undertaking a function not its own. On the other hand, by adhering rigidly to its
own duty, the court will help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where responsibility lies,
and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of popular condemnation. The
judiciary, to-day, in dealing with the acts of their coordinate legislators, owe to the country
no greater or clearer duty than that of keeping their hands off these acts wherever it is
possible to do it. For that course--the true course of judicial duty always-will powerfully
help to bring the people and their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility."
THAYER, HOLMES, & FRANKFURTER, JOHN MARSHALL 87-88 (Phoenix ed. 1967).
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The public's reaction to the Court's abortion actions reaffirms the
earlier opinion of one of Justice Black's former colleagues. Time, Justice Robert Jackson remarked, "has proved that [the Court's] judgment
was wrong on most of the outstanding issues upon which it has chosen
to challenge the popular branches. ' 283 The privacy doctrine has not
proved an exception to this statement.28 4
VI.

Conclusion

The cardinal tenet of Mr. Justice Black's constitutional jurisprudence was his belief that the Constitution was framed with the goal of
preventing any one department of government from collecting, retaining or exercising uncontrolled power.2 8 5 The paradox of a
nondemocratic Judiciary acting within a system professing to attach a
paramount value to rule by democratic methods disturbed Justice
Black no less than many of his contemporaries. 28 6 Although he fully
accepted the propriety of judicial review zS7 when itupheld the primacy
of a constitutional policy decision, he restricted the exercise of this
power to the finite number of values verifiable by direct reference to the
constitutional text.288
The thesis of Justice Black's dialectic was a scheme of governmental powers and purposes which allowed for a hierarchy of permissible
judicial activity. These mandates descended in force and legitimacy
from the absolutes of the First Amendment, the situational bans
against excessive bail and unreasonable searches and seizures, to the
283. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, at x (1941).
284. Renunciation of the Grirwoldsubstantive due process concept would not require the
Court to vest in government the constitutionally unfettered authority to intrude into an individuals privacy. It would, however, require the Court to confine privacy to those instances
where it may be recognized as a value whose scope does not exceed the reach of a specific
constitutional provision. The demise of Griswold would not affect those privacy interests
which inhere in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
285. BLACK, supra note 82 at 3-22.
286. On the effect of this phenomenon on the profession in general, see Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH.L. REV.283 (1965).
Justice John Harlan, whose conceptualization of due process was the polar opposite of
Justice Black's, said of his colleague: "No Justice, whether coming from the political arena
or otherwise, has worn his judicial robes with a keener sense of the limitations that go with
them than has Mr. Justice Black." Harlan, Mr. JusticeBlack-Remarks ofa Colleague, 81
HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1967).
287. 381 U.S. at 513, 521. This was not precisely the same view he held upon his accession to the Court: "When I first came to the Court, I had grave doubts about judicial review.
Grave doubts. But I am now convinced that if we are to have the form of free government
and free society which the Constitution intends, the Court must function as it has." Remarks made by Justice Black, quotedin Frank, The New Court and the New Deal in HUGO
BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT 63 (S.
Strickland ed. 1967).
288. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Courts Role in HUGO BLACK AND THE
SUPREME COURT 142 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
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complete absence ofjudicial power to review social and economic legislation which does not present a facial conflict with a specific constitutional provision. This last category will always provide the broadest
and most seductive outlet for improper judicial action because the Constitution does not specifically show that judicial action is forbidden.
Released from explicit contextual constitutional guidance, and confronted with laws which will often involve the attempted resolution of
debatable issues, contemporary judicial activity may all too easily illegitimately interfere with the democratic process. Legislation in this
residual sector should come before the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, bolstered by the electoral authority of its makers.
When laws touch upon topics unforeseen and unforeseeable by the
Framers, Justice Black adamantly believed that "elected legislature[s]
. . .must have the last word on a289
wide range of problems in any system that hopes to be democratic."
.Legislative acts or omissions in these nebulous realms, however
"arbitrary," "unwise" or "unreasonable," must be allowed. Justice
Black refused to exercise a judicial oversight for laws on the cutting
edge of current controversy, serene in the belief that the process which
produces misguided legislation carries with it its own self-correcting
mechanisms and that the people are fully capable of protecting their
own interests. 290 A democratic system that indulges the people's right
to experiment with social regulation presumes that the tension between
expectation and reality produced by such laws will furnish the impetus
for correction. This scheme must be accepted by the Judiciary unless
legislative power and Article V are to be considered mere gestures. The
flaws in democratic government must be tolerated by courts. Society
will not be served by disparaging the democratic process, the people's
most basic right and the Constitution's most fundamental and pervasive value.2 9 '
Whatever the benefits of privacy as an abstract principle, it was
created at the expense of a greater value. Since the people have subsequently disproved the predicate of the Griswolddecision-the inability
or unwillingness of the political branches to protect privacy-it becomes obvious in hindsight that the Court needlessly sacrificed the
principle of judicial self-restraint while utilizing a doctrine with a
proven potential for harming the judiciary and the country. Given
289. Rostow, Mr. Justice Black: Some Introductory Remarks, 65 YALE L.J. 451, 452
(1956). The Justice said that states should be allowed the maximum latitude possible "in
areas where they have a general constitutional competence to act." Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 674 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
290. Ball, Hugo L. Black: .4Twentieth Century Jeffersonian, 9 Sw. U.L. REv.1049, 1053
(1977); 404 U.S. vii (remarks of Burger, C.J. announcing death of Mr. Justice Black). See
also BLACK, supra note 82, at 11.
291. See notes 166-67 supra.

Spring 1980]

Spring 1980]

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

such a balance sheet, Justice Black felt that the benefits are not worth
the danger of abuse and that no policy arguments or professed adherence to the intent of the Constitution could be pleaded in its favor.2 92
Bereft of demonstrable ties to the Constitution, Griswold is a
throwback to the Constitution's distrust of vesting any branch of government with unbridled power lest it become unprincipled tyranny.
Substantive due process is thus a standing invitation to the establishment of a kritarchy, for it "lies about like a loaded weapon for the hand
of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need. ' 293 To continue the metaphor, the Court might well remember
that such an instrument, when defective, has a distressing tendency to
endanger all around it, the wielder as well as the intended target.

292. Justice Black would later speak with greater particularity to the issues and dangers
involved when democratic right is set against judicial will. In 1967, he joined Justice
Harlan's dissent in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), where the Court struck down a
state constitutional provision passed by a direct vote of the people which, in effect, legalized
private discrimination in the sale of privately owned real property. Justice Harlan said that
in areas implicating "delicate and troublesome problems. . . fraught. . . with human sensibilities and frailties" the Court should not contrive "new and ill-defined constitutional
concept[s]" lest it arrogate to itself "powers and responsibilities left elsewhere by the Constitution." Id. at 395-96 (Harlan, Black, Clark and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). These words apply with equal force to Griswold.
293. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

